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ABSTRACT 
 
One key water resource challenge that faces the eastern United States today is 
how to regulate water withdrawals by offstream users, while preserving the fair sharing 
philosophy of the common-law Riparian Doctrine. Traditionally, this doctrine requires 
that riparians (users owning land adjacent to a stream) limit their withdrawals to what can 
be judged as “reasonable use.” Water allocation regulations are currently being formed 
amid emerging water competition, due to rapidly growing water demand and increasingly 
frequent water shortages.  
The study reported in the present dissertation develops a new type of water 
allocation scheme called the Proportionally Fair (ProFair) Program, which stresses on the 
fair sharing of water among withdrawers. The ProFair program is based on the 
Proportional Fairness Criterion, which is originally developed for bandwidth allocation in 
electronic communication networks. Three different methods are developed to attain the 
proportionally fair allocation, namely a log-linear programming model, a quadratic 
programming model, and a greedy procedure called the ‘Bottleneck Algorithm’. The 
performance of the ProFair program, both in terms of equity and economic efficiency, is 
compared with four alternative hypothetical regulatory programs which are rooted in 
three different regulatory principles: the Benefit Maximizing (MaxBen) program, based 
on the principle of maximizing economic benefit, the Downstream Priority (DPrio) and 
the Upstream Priority with Municipal and Industrial User Privilege (UMIPrio) programs, 
based on the principle of prioritization according to type of use and/or geographical 
location, and the No-Rule (NR) program, which represents the status quo in many eastern 
 
 
ii
states, and which is based on the principle of minimal regulation. Mathematical models 
are developed for each water allocation program. Economic efficiency and equity are 
measured by aggregate net benefit and a measurement called the Equity Index, 
respectively. Following the primary allocation programs, this study further develops a 
trading model to simulate a water rights market under each of the alternative programs. 
Water allocation and water market simulations under the five allocation programs 
are performed for the Sangamon River system in Illinois under two economic scenarios 
and various reservoir capacities over a 30-year period. The simulation results show that 
the ProFair program dominates all other programs in fairness, generating the highest 
equity index in any year under any condition. Although the ProFair program results in 
lower net benefit than the MaxBen and UMIPrio programs, its economic efficiency can 
be improved through a properly instituted water rights market with complete information 
and minimum transaction costs. The results also demonstrate that changing supply and 
demand conditions have significant impacts on benefit, fairness, and market activities of 
all programs. Based on those findings, the dissertation recommends that policy makers 
give more consideration to the proportionally fair allocation due to its consistency with 
the Riparian Doctrine. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past decades, the eastern portion of the United States, which has 
generally been considered humid and water-rich, has been experiencing growing water 
consumption and increasingly frequent water shortages. Expanding municipal and 
industrial demand, along with increasing use of supplemental irrigation, rapidly escalates 
consumptive water use (see e.g. Dziegielewski, 2002 for documentation of this for 
Illinois). Water competition and conflict are emerging in many heavily developed regions 
in the eastern states (Sansonetti and Quest, 2003). The recent increase in popularity of 
biofuels has furthered the trend by creating large additional water demands from both the 
raw material and end production processes of biofuel production (IATP, 2006; Aden, 
2007). Meanwhile, water availability conditions are also changing. More stringent 
streamflow protection regulations are making the development of new water supply 
sources more difficult (Ruhl, 2003). The erratic drought patterns that have been observed 
in recent years as a possible impact of the global climate change (Gaffen and Ross, 1998; 
Manuel, 2008) are raising serious concerns about the sustainability of water supply in the 
future. 
Traditionally, the eastern states have followed the common-law Riparian Doctrine 
in the allocation of surface water. The Riparian Doctrine protects a vaguely defined 
‘reasonable use’ right of all users along the same waterway and requires them to share 
water with and avoid unnecessary injury to each other. Because of the lack of accurate 
language in the doctrine, the sharing of water becomes largely voluntary, which leads 
inevitably to the problem known as ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin, 1968) as water 
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demands approach or exceed supplies. With the growing water conflicts in the eastern 
states, the traditional common-law systems are being widely criticized for their lack of 
specificity, allowing for too little administrative intervention, and relying too heavily on 
protracted court rulings for conflict resolution. 
The growing needs for better water allocation management have pushed some 
eastern states to transform their traditional Riparian water laws toward a comprehensive 
body of more proactive and less ambiguous administrative statutes. At the core of these 
statutes is a permit system that requires qualified withdrawers to acquire a precisely 
defined water permit. While codifying the withdrawal regulations, most eastern states 
preserve the Riparian Doctrine as the legal foundation. The term ‘Regulated Riparianism’ 
has been given to these emerging new water law systems to emphasize their ties with 
both the common-law tradition and the recent statutory buildup. 
An effectively functioning water permit system needs a sound approach to 
quantify each user’s withdrawal limit. For that purpose, two approaches have emerged, 
the fixed permits and the flexible permits. The fixed permit approach, which has so far 
gained some popularity in the eastern states (see e.g. Maryland Department of the 
Environment, 2008, Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, 2006, Northwest 
Florida Water Management District, 1998, etc.), defines for each user a fixed maximum 
withdrawal rate in a given period of the year. A permit may be subject to multiple 
withdrawal limits for different seasons. This approach takes little, if any, consideration of 
the fluctuation of water availability, and hence must be coupled with some sort of priority 
arrangement in order to mitigate possible water conflicts during times of drought. The 
priority system can be either time-based, like those established in the western states, or 
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type-based, as have been favored by the majority of eastern states. But no matter which 
type of priority is chosen, the basic idea is to protect the benefit of those who rank high 
on the priority list at the cost of those who rank low. The time-based priority is 
apparently in contradiction with the reasonable use theory of the Riparian Doctrine, and, 
as a result, has not been successfully adopted by any eastern state. The type-based 
priority system, although seemingly consistent with the preference approach recognized 
by the Riparian Doctrine, finds its specifics a frequent matter of debate (see e.g. Butler, 
1986). Moreover, the type-based priority cannot address the apportionment among users 
of the same type. Thus, the fixed permit approach leaves a number of legal uncertainties 
remaining to be addressed. 
As its name suggests, the flexible permit approach allows each user’s withdrawal 
limit to vary according to the current hydrologic conditions. One typical example of the 
flexible permit is the fractional flow permit (Eheart and Lyon, 1983; Eheart, 2002), which 
allows users along a common waterway to each withdrawal a predetermined portion of 
the streamflow. Thus, the users’ allowable withdrawals all increase proportionally as the 
streamflow increases, and vice versa. This pro rata approach has a number of advantages. 
First, it does not need a coupled priority arrangement to resolve water conflicts, since the 
damage of water shortage is shared by all. Second, its emphasis on sharing is in perfect 
agreement with the Riparian Doctrine. Thus, there are fewer legal hurdles for the 
adoption of this approach in the Eastern States compared to the fixed permit approach. 
However, this intuitively straightforward and legally justifiable approach has 
rarely been exercised on a large scale by regulators in the eastern states. Neither has it 
been seriously discussed in the water allocation literature, except for a small number of 
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in-depth studies (Eheart and Lyon, 1983; Wong and Eheart, 1983; Harrison, 1991; An, 
2004; An and Eheart, 2006). One important reason for the lack of interest in this 
approach is that the fractional flow permit program, which has so far been examined only 
in single-gage systems, does not appear to have the capability of determining the 
allocation in a more complicated real-world system, which often involves multiple gages, 
multiple tributaries, and scattered users. With the existing fractional flow equations, it is 
not clear which gage or combination of gages should be referenced to calculate the 
withdrawal of a particular user, and at what fraction. 
It becomes clear that there needs to be a new type of fractional flow approach, 
which can be used to determine the allocation in a geometrically complicated water 
allocation system. Thus, to develop such an approach becomes one of the objectives, and 
a significant contribution, of this dissertation. 
Recent research on bandwidth allocation in electronic communication network 
has shed some light on this task. Kelley and his colleagues (Kelley, 1997; Kelley et al., 
1998) found a mathematical model that can achieve a so-called Proportionally Fair 
allocation for an electronic communication network with dynamic bandwidth. This study 
shows that, using several different models or algorithms, this Proportionally Fair 
allocation can also be produced in a distributed water allocation network, the structure of 
which can be viewed as a specific type of communication network. The fractional flow 
program is just a special case of the Proportionally Fair allocation when the system has 
only one reference gage. 
The second objective of this dissertation is to examine how the Proportionally 
Fair allocation compares to four alternative allocation mechanisms. These alternative 
 
 
4
allocation mechanisms are selected based on three different water allocation principles. 
They are 1) the Benefit Maximizing allocation, based on the principle of economic 
maximization; 2) the Downstream Priority allocation and 3) the Upstream Priority 
allocation with municipal and industrial user privilege, based on the principle of 
prioritization; and 4) the No-Rule allocation, based on the principle of minimum 
regulation. A mathematical model will be developed to simulate each of these 
mechanisms.  
All five allocation mechanisms will be evaluated based not only on their 
economic performance, but also on their fairness. Fairness is characterized quantitatively 
by an Equity Index, which is developed to measure the level of uniformity in the water 
supply satisfaction levels among users. 
The third objective of this dissertation is to investigate the behavior and potential 
outcome of a water rights market when combined with the above primary water 
allocation programs. Water rights markets have been implemented and proved to be 
beneficial in many western states. In recent years, water markets have been increasingly 
discussed in the context of the eastern US. It is widely believed that a properly instituted 
water rights market can improve water use efficiency and create considerable economic 
benefit by allowing water to be transferred from low-value to high-value uses. For a 
flexible permit program, a water market can not only improve economic efficiency, but 
also help address another shortcoming of the flexible permit program: the lack of 
certainty. For users who are also water infrastructure investors and who may be 
concerned about whether the flexible permit program can sustain a profitable withdrawal, 
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a water market can offer them a viable alternative means to secure their water supply in 
times of shortage. 
This dissertation develops a mathematical model to simulate the water rights 
market under each of the selected programs. The form of water market that is of primary 
concern in the present dissertation is a ‘spot market’, where water rights are transferred 
on a short-term basis to meet immediate needs. Based on the model, this dissertation will 
further present an analytical framework that can be used to examine several 
characteristics of a spot market, such as the volumes of water transferred, prices at which 
water is transferred, transaction revenues, and net market gains. 
The Sangamon River watershed in Illinois is chosen as a case study, to perform 
water allocation and water market simulations under the five allocation programs. The 
simulation will be performed based on two scenarios: the ‘Current’ scenario based on a 
mixture of real and hypothesized water demands and economic conditions in 2006, and 
the Future scenario based on projected water demands and economic conditions in 2030. 
Historical rainfall and streamflow data from 1977 through 2006 combined with a series 
of different reservoir storage conditions are used as hydrologic input for the analysis. The 
monetary results are all converted to the 2006 dollar. 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Following this Introduction chapter, 
Chapter 2 gives a brief literature review of the water laws and relevant water allocation 
studies in the eastern US. Chapter 3 documents the efforts to develop mathematical 
models for the selected water allocation programs and the water market. Chapter 4 
describes the setup for water allocation and market simulation in the Sangamon River 
watershed. Data utilized and assumptions adopted are presented and discussed. Chapter 5 
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presents the major results obtained from the simulation. Finally, chapter 6 concludes the 
dissertation, makes recommendations, and points out the possible directions for future 
studies. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Emerging Water Shortages in Eastern US 
 Historically, the Eastern United States, often defined as the 31 states to the east of 
the 100th Meridian, has enjoyed abundant rainfall. People living in these states have 
considered water to be readily available at little or no cost. Over the past several decades, 
however, many eastern states have witnessed rapid growth in water consumption coupled 
with occasional water shortages and increase in water conflicts. Continuous population 
growth and economic development, enhanced legislation for in-stream flow protection, 
and emerging concerns with erratic drought patterns linked to climate change are 
combining to place increasing pressure on the already stressed water resources. 
 Analysis of water use trends in the US (Dziegielewski et al., 2002) shows that the 
water withdrawal for public supply and rural domestic use has been rising continuously 
in the eastern US from 1960 to 1995. This growth has coincided with the nationwide 
increase in total population and family income. A recent survey (US General Accounting 
Office, 2003) carried out in 47 states showed that due to population growth and 
insufficient water facilities, water managers in 36 of the states, many in the East, expect 
water shortages at state, regional, or local level even under average water conditions in 
the following decade. 
The latest surge of ethanol production in the early 21st century has raised new 
water resource concerns, especially in the Midwestern States, such as Iowa, Illinois, 
Minnesota, and Indiana, which host more than half of the existing and potential ethanol 
plants in the US. In 2006, about 6.5 billion gallons (24.6 × 106 m3) of ethanol were 
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produced, nearly 3 times as much as in 2002 (RFA, 2008). As of 2008, the total ethanol 
production capacity in US has reached 13.6 billion gallons (51.5 × 106 m3) per year, with 
another 3.8 billion gallons (14.3 × 106 m3) under expansion (RFA, 2008). Given the US 
biofuel production goal of 36 billion gallon (136.3 × 106 m3) by 2022 (Tyner, 2008) and 
estimated 3 to 6 units of water required for the production of per unit corn ethanol, it is 
predicted that water withdrawal by the ethanol industry will continue to increase 
substantially in the Midwest, enhancing the existing water competitions in the region 
(IATP, 2006). 
Meanwhile, concerns have emerged that high food price, partly driven by rising 
energy cost and the growing demand for corn for ethanol production, may attract more 
and more farmers to adopt irrigation technology to ensure good yield. These farmers have 
relied traditionally on rain-fed land. Starting from early 2006, corn price went from an 
average of $87 per metric ton up to $217 per metric ton ($2.2 to $5.5 per bushel) in two 
years (Tyner, 2008), at times topping $300 per metric ton. Meanwhile, prices of other 
crops, such as soybeans and wheat, have been growing at a similar rate, according to the 
Chicago Board of Trade (www.cbot.com). Many eastern states have experienced a steady 
increase in irrigated farmland in the past decades. Some Midwestern states, such as 
Wisconsin, Indiana, Illinois, etc., have seen an increase in irrigation water use of more 
than 500% between 1960 and 1995 (Dziegielewski et al., 2002). In the Southeast, 
frequently occurring droughts in the past decades have intensified the interest in 
supplement irrigation, resulting in a steady growth of irrigated farmland (Cassel et al., 
1985). A recent modeling study in Illinois (Eheart and Tornil, 1999) has shown that 
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basin-wide irrigation practice may substantially diminish streamflow during drought 
periods. 
 Recent studies suggest that climate change is likely to stress water supply in the 
eastern US. It is observed that the eastern US has been under a significant upward trend 
in the frequency of extreme heat stress event in the past half century (Gaffen and Ross, 
1998). This observation is consistent with a number of modeling studies (Delworth, et al., 
1999; Gregory et al., 1997; Meehl et al., 2000), which predict that the combination of 
increased temperature and evaporation will likely raise temperature and the risk of 
drought in the southeastern US. Scientists from the US Climate Change Science Program 
also suggest that in a future climate there is an increased likelihood of more intense, 
longer-lasting and more frequent heat waves, which could aggravate the extremes of dry 
conditions in the Southeast, even though these events are interspersed with an increasing 
number of floods (CCSP, 2008). In recent years, that area has seen increasingly frequent 
severe droughts (Karl and Young, 1987; Manuel, 2008). The recent droughts in 2001, 
2005, and 2007 have caused unprecedented drops in streamflow and levels of water 
supply reservoirs (see e.g. US Army Corps of Engineers, 2008), leaving several 
municipal areas, such as Atlanta, Georgia, Raleigh, North Carolina, and Southern Florida 
at times with only weeks or even days of water supply (Manuel, 2008; Fletcher, 2002). 
Increasing legislation over in-stream flow protection and minimum water level 
has also posed additional limits on water supply in many eastern states. As of 1995, 23 
eastern states have established minimum flow standard to ensure there is adequate water 
to protect the stream environment (Foran et al., 1995). Reservoirs in these states are 
mandated to comply with minimum release standards for aquatic habitat protection 
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during a dry period. In order to protect the level of the Great Lakes, the eight Great Lake 
states are subject to firm restrictions under the Great Lakes Basin Compact on the amount 
of water each of them can divert from the lakes. As a result, heavily populated areas 
around the Great Lakes, such as Chicago, have to seek additional water supply sources 
from ground water and inland streams to meet their ever growing demands (Illinois 
Department of Natural Resources, 2004; Campaign for Sensible Growth, et al., 2005). 
The interaction of growing demand and shrinking supply has sharpened the water 
conflict in the East over the past decades. There have been growing number of intra- and 
inter-state water disputes in the East on a scale that has traditionally only been seen in the 
western states (Dellapenna, 2007). Such conflicts widely occur between various interest 
groups, such as agriculture and municipalities (Gold et al., 1988; Norris, 2001; Thomas et 
al., 2003; MacDonnell and Rice, 1995), large cites and their neighboring communities 
(Chew et al., 2006; Schicht et al., 1976), as well as states sharing the same watercourse 
(Ruhl, 2005; Cox, 2007; Jordan, Jones and Goulding, Inc., 2003; Lipford, 2004; Sherk, 
1994). 
 In her latest book, Mirage: Florida and the Vanishing Water of the Eastern U.S. 
(2007), Cynthia Barnett wrote: 
 A century ago, Floridians thought their biggest problem was too 
much water where people wanted to settle. Now, our biggest problem is that 
we do not have enough water where people want to settle.  
Florida is typical of many eastern states which have experienced heavy 
urbanization, fast economic boom, as well as emerging water crises in the 20th century. 
Today, the eastern states of the US are facing the water challenges that used to be seen 
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only in the water-short West (Gould, 2002). Tackling the growing water shortages and 
water competitions will continue to be a challenging task that requires comprehensive 
and innovative efforts. 
 
2.2 The Riparian Doctrine and Evolution of Eastern Water Laws in the 20th Century 
2.2.1 The Common Law Riparian Doctrine 
 In terms of water rights, there are two distinctively different categories of legal 
doctrines being followed in the United States. The eastern portion of the country, 
consisting of the 31 states east of Kansas City, generally embraces the Riparian Doctrine, 
which traditionally treats natural water as a common property. The western portion of the 
US, consisting of the states west of Kansas City, generally follows the Prior 
Appropriation Doctrine, which recognizes private ownership of water rights.  
It is believed that the Riparian Doctrine is rooted in English Common Law. The 
doctrine was first introduced to the US through the case Tyler v. Wilkinson (1827) 
(Tarlock, 2002; Tarlock et al., 2002). The core concept of the Riparian Doctrine is that 
every riparian land owner has an equal right to reasonable use of the water in the 
watercourse abutting his or her land. The right is tied to the land and can neither be 
transferred from riparian land owners to non-riparian land owners, nor be lost through 
non-use. The word riparian is derived from the Latin word “ripa”, which means river 
bank (Tarlock, 2002). 
The Riparian Doctrine is based on the premise that water is abundantly available, 
an assumption that was generally true throughout most of the history of the eastern US. 
Historically, the Riparian Doctrine used to require that no use should alter the natural 
flow of the watercourse (Sherk, 1990; Scott and Coustalin, 1995). Under the modern 
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understanding of the doctrine, however, each riparian owner can make any use of water, 
regardless of the impacts the use has to streamflow, as long as each user does not injure 
other riparians’ reasonable uses (Dellapenna, 1998). 
In contrast, many parts of the water-short western US follow a distinctively 
different water rights approach. Although some western states recognize limited riparian 
rights (especially on streams whose watersheds lie entirely within a single state’s borders), 
most western states rely on the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, which recognizes unequal 
water rights based on the principle of ‘first in time, first in right’. Established in the Gold 
Rush era in the mid 19th century, this principle gives the highest withdrawal priority to 
the earliest permit registrants who claim their uses to be beneficial, regardless of their 
location and distance from watercourses. When drought occurs, water rights are curtailed 
in the order of their juniority and the most senior users receive the highest protection. 
Based on this basic principle, many western states have developed sophisticated 
regulatory systems, which, by clearly defining each user’s withdrawal permit and priority, 
provide effective mechanisms for allocating water among competing users. As noted 
above, water rights administration in the western US relies on a mixture of the Riparian 
and appropriative doctrine. Some western states, such as California and Texas, have 
developed a ‘dual system’, which recognizes both prior appropriation and riparian rights. 
For over a century following Tyler, the eastern states stuck closely to the 
reasonable-use version of the Riparian Doctrine and made little change to their common 
law water rights (Scott and Coustalin, 1995). It is simply uneconomical for a water-rich 
state to maintain a comprehensive water rights system (Butler, 1985; Foran et al., 1995). 
However, critics of the traditional Riparianism have emerged throughout the 20th century 
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in the face of more frequently recurring water deficiency and growing demand for better 
water allocation management. The most frequently cited problem with the traditional 
common law system is that its poorly defined reasonable-use theory fails to provide the 
certainty that is needed for an effective water allocation management. The Riparian 
Doctrine allows riparian land owners along the same watercourse to share the water, but 
is not able clearly to specify the size of each owner’s share. Without such quantitative 
definition, the regulators have limited enforcement power to regulate water withdrawals, 
especially when water competition exists. In practice, users have to rely on costly and 
protracted legal procedures to settle water disputes arising from drought situations. 
The uncertain nature of the riparian water rights encourages selfish behavior 
among water users, which, as pointed out by several commentators (Dellapenna, 1998; 
Foran, 1995; Sherk, 1990), leads inevitably to a problem known as the ‘Tragedy of the 
Commons’ (Hardin, 1968). Without a quantitative standard, the users are left to their 
individual judgments on how much water to use. Such a situation is unlikely to cause 
serious consequence as long as there is always excessive water running in the stream. As 
a shortage emerges, however, each user’s economic interest would be best served by 
maximizing his or her own withdrawal before everybody else behaves in the same way to 
deplete the shared resource. When numerous individuals follow the same greedy behavior, 
the resource will inevitably be exhausted, and to worse effect than if one entity owned all 
the water and the water-using facilities. Lacking an effective regulatory mechanism to 
control water withdrawals, the common law system can hardly prevent such a tragedy 
from happening. It can neither protect the stream from being destroyed, nor assure 
individuals’ water rights not to be injured by others. 
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 As growing demand creates ever greater stress on water resources in the eastern 
states, there is a clearer need for a new Riparian system which can provide a more 
appropriate definition of individual water rights and a more effective mechanism for 
water allocation management than the traditional common law system. 
 
2.2.2 Riparian Water Laws in the 20th Century 
 In response to the inadequacies of the traditional Riparian Doctrine, the eastern 
states of the United States have taken different approaches to improve their water laws. 
Some earlier efforts attempted fully or partially to replace the common law system with 
the western-style appropriative water rights system. Due to the hardship in dealing with 
the existing ownership of riparian rights, the legislatures who want to establish 
appropriative rights in the traditional common-law states can at best develop a dual 
system, which inherits existing riparian rights as the earliest appropriative rights (ASCE, 
2004). Such system has been created in some western states, such as California and Texas. 
Although favored by numerous scholars (e.g. Milliman, 1959; Trelease, 1977; Gould, 
2002), this approach has however not been successful in the eastern states. Mississippi is 
the first and only eastern state that has formally introduced the prior-use doctrine to their 
existing riparian system, but the reform was unsuccessful. The state adopted a dual 
system in 1955, but repealed it later in 1985. During the 30 years, the appropriative 
doctrine was never cited by any court in the state, although numerous water disputes 
occurred in that period (Dellapenna, 1998; Dellapenna, 2002).  
Dellapenna (2002) discusses the reasons for the failure of the western-style water 
rights in Mississippi. He reasons that under the dual system, where pre-existing riparian 
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rights enjoy superiority over appropriative rights, users have little incentive to claim 
appropriative rights, because neither riparians nor non-riparians would benefit from doing 
so in terms of better securing their withdrawals. He further points out that the benefit-cost 
ineffectiveness of the approach reflected in the Mississippi experience is a strong reason 
for the eastern states to reject the appropriative doctrine as practiced in the West, even 
without considering the other shortcomings of the approach. 
Instead of adopting the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, some eastern states have 
started to develop a new legal system for water allocation, which can be best described as 
a comprehensive statutory system of water administration. The new system borrows some 
features from western water rights, but preserves the basic principles of the Riparian 
Doctrine. Such a system is frequently referred to as ‘regulated riparianism’ (Dellapenna, 
1998; ASCE, 1997; ASCE, 2004; Beck, 2000; Tarlock, 2006; Miano and Crane, 2003).  
Dellapenna (1998 and 2002) views regulated riparianism as fundamentally 
different from the traditional common law riparianism. Regulated riparianism does not 
assume a vested water right attached to any land, riparian or non-riparian. Rather, with 
few exceptions, it allows no water to be withdrawn without a proved permit with clearly 
specified quantity (whether conditioned on current streamflows or not) and an effective 
period. In determining the permit, regulated riparianism inherited the reasonable use 
theory from the traditional Riparian Doctrine. But instead of using the reasonable use 
rules in judicial processes to review existing uses, as has been done traditionally under 
the common-law system, the regulated riparian system determines the reasonableness of a 
water use through an administrative agency prior to the start of the withdrawal. Moreover, 
the regulated riparian statutes abandon common law restrictions on the location of use 
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and treat riparian and non-riparian permits equally. Furthermore, to enforce the permits, 
the statutes enable state administrations to use police power to enforce withdrawal rules. 
Based on the above characterization, Dellapenna (in ASCE, 2004) identified the states 
that have already established a regulated riparian system (Figure 2.1). 
Year
1950
 
Not all eastern states have developed a highly regulated water rights system. 
Some states, such as Louisiana, West Virginia and the part of Illinois outside the Lake 
Michigan basin, are still largely following the traditional common law system. Some 
1960
Iowa
Maryland
Wisconsin 
Delaware 
Kentucky
1970 South Carolinab
1980
1990
2000
Florida Minnesota 
North Carolinac
Georgiad
New Yorka 
Connecticut
IllinoisbArkansasa
Massachusettsb
Mississippi
Virginiad
Alabamaa
a. Less completely developed or implemented than for other regulated 
riparian states. 
b. Permits required for the Lake Michigan basin and ground water only. 
c. Applicable to critical management areas only. 
d. Date refers to the adoption of regulation for surface water. 
Figure 2.1 Timeline for the adoption of a regulated riparian 
system by eastern states of US (modified from Dellapenna, 2004). 
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others, such as Tennessee and Ohio, only require registration of use. Even in the states 
listed in Figure 2.1, the regulation may not be applicable state-wide or to all types of 
water. Nevertheless, studies on the modern history of eastern water laws have all 
concluded that the trend in the eastern water law is moving toward a more comprehensive, 
permit-based statutory legislation (Ausness, 1983; Foran et al., 1995; Sherk, 1990; 
Dellapenna, 2002; Abrams, 1989). 
Recently, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) published the 
Regulated Riparian Model Water Code (ASCE, 1997; ASCE, 2004). The model code 
embodies the characteristics of regulated riparianism and provides legislative guidance 
for state legislatures who want to improve their water allocation regulations in order to 
meet the challenge of ever growing water competitions.  
The regulated riparian water laws imbue the state administration with greater 
power to design and implement a wide variety of regulatory instruments, such as 
permitting systems, enforcement mechanisms, short- and long-term planning, drought 
emergency action plans, and so on. As a result, the system largely avoids the costly and 
time-consuming legal processes under the traditional common-law system and therefore 
provides substantially higher efficiency and certainty. It also creates opportunities for the 
emergence of new and innovative water allocation mechanisms. 
 
2.3 Equitable Flow Sharing under the Provision of Regulated Riparianism 
 
 A permit system requires a quantitative approach to determine the upper limit of 
each user’s withdrawal. For uses of surface water, two approaches have emerged: the 
fixed permit program and the flexible permit program. The fixed permit system, which 
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has gained popularity in both eastern and western states, regulates withdrawals by issuing 
each user a permit of fixed maximum withdrawal rate (e.g., m3/s) without considering the 
fluctuation of water availability. During its effective period, a fixed permit allows its 
owner to withdraw the water available to him or her up to a maximum of the amount 
specified by the permit. On the other hand, the flexible permit system, which has not been 
widely adopted but has a number of promising features, controls withdrawal based on a 
floating limit and allows users to increase and decrease their withdrawals according to ad 
hoc hydrological conditions. One typical example of the flexible permit is the fractional 
flow system (Eheart and Lyon, 1983; Eheart, 2002), which allows each user to withdraw 
a constant percentage of local streamflow. When streamflow fluctuates, the allowable 
withdrawals of the users sharing the same watercourse change accordingly. 
 Both fixed and flexible permit systems are faced with the issue of how to curtail 
withdrawals in times of drought when available water is insufficient to meet all permitted 
demands. To address this problem, the fixed permit program is often implemented in 
conjunction with a priority system. When a shortage occurs, permits with the lowest 
priority are suspended temporarily to protect permits with higher priority. As the shortage 
progresses more deeply, more and more permits are stopped in the reverse order of 
priority. In the western US, the temporal priority system based on the ‘first in time, first 
in right’ theory under the appropriative water rights has long existed. Such a system can 
protect the users with grandfathered water rights against junior permit holders. In the 
eastern US, on the other hand, the type-based priority system derived from the reasonable 
use theory of the Riparian Doctrine has been adopted by most of the regulated riparian 
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states. Typically, domestic uses are protected with the highest priority, while luxury uses, 
such as recreational and aesthetic are often the first to be restricted in response to drought. 
 The type based priority system cannot fully address the problem of drought 
emergency allocation. It is not capable of apportioning the water when the competing 
users are of the same type, e.g. farmers counting on a shared river to irrigate their lands. 
In addition, it is argued that the type based priority system may cause political and 
economic controversy (Trelease, 1974). In that case, a flexible system which requires 
users to share equitably the burden of a shortage seems to constitute a better solution. 
When water is insufficient to meet total demand, all users are mandated to reduce 
individual withdrawals based on pre-specified rules. No one would have a privileged 
exemption, nor would any one be entirely deprived of water rights to protect others. 
 The idea of equitable flow sharing has been long rooted in the history of the 
common law Riparian Doctrine, which emphasizes equal rights and demands sharing 
among users when damage is present. Based on the reasonable use theory, a riparian must 
be conscious of the common right of other riparians located above and below his property 
and should avoid interfering with their water rights in exercising his own (Butler, 1985). 
In Harris v. Brooks, which took place in 1955 in Arkansas, the court found that all lawful 
uses of water other than strictly domestic use are equal. When one lawful use of water 
interferes with another equally lawful use, a solution requiring both parties to make a 
reasonable and equitable adjustment to their withdrawals should be considered (Gould, 
2002). 
 A logically sound and technically simple approach, pro rata sharing has been 
favored by the court in numerous historical cases. For example, in the landmark-setting 
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case, Evans v. Merriweather (1842), the Illinois Supreme Court established the concept 
of just proportion (see Mann and Krausz, 1964; Clark, 1985). In that case, two mills 
located along the same stream disputed over water use during a dry summer. The court 
held that all riparian proprietors have a right to participate in the benefits of the water not 
needed to supply natural wants, but none has a right to use all of it. The court further 
ruled that: 
“Where all have a right to participate in a common benefit (artificial 
wants), and none can have an exclusive enjoyment, no rule, from the very nature 
of the case, can be laid down, as to how much each may use without infringing 
upon the right of others. In such cases, the question must be left to the judgment 
of the jury, whether the party complained of has used, under all circumstances, 
more than his just proportion.”  
Note that by use of the phrase “just proportion, “ rather than “equal proportion,” 
the court left the door open to proportional allocations prioritized by type of use. In a 
later case in Illinois, Bliss v. Kennedy (1867), the court exercised the principles from 
Evans and ruled that the flow shall be divided between the two parties in proportion to 
their respective requirements (Mann and Krausz, 1964; Clark et al., 1976; Clark, 1985). 
Even in the Appropriative western states, proportional sharing among irrigators 
has been widely practiced, especially within irrigation districts. According to Gould and 
Grant (2002), some western irrigation districts which take water wholesale and retail 
water to irrigators require their customers to share shortage on pro rata basis when 
stream flow or storage is insufficient to supply in full the districts appropriation. In 
several water rights law suits, the courts allocated fixed proportions of water to each of 
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the affected riparian irrigators, although the basis for determining the proportions varied 
from case to case. 
 The new era of the regulated riparianism creates opportunities for the invention of 
a variety of flexible permit mechanisms under the statutory provisions. Dellapenna (2004) 
suggested that a well-designed regulated riparian system would bring within its scope all 
significant water users and it will treat them all equally in terms of the criteria within the 
statute. Grigg (1996) pointed out the needs by the eastern states relying on administrative 
permitting to develop a system of curtailing uses when water is short so that the loss 
could be fairly shared.  
 Lipford (2004) proposed a pro rata approach involving the oversight of the Army 
Corps of Engineers to solving the drought-introduced conflicts. Based on his design, the 
Army Corps of Engineers could first establish a daily “water budget,” consisting of the 
total net withdrawals allowed from the basin, based on average daily withdrawals from 
some past period of consumption. After this global budget is established, the Army Corps 
of Engineers could grant water allocations to each user based on average daily use, again 
from some period of past consumption. When the supply of rainfall was abundant, so that 
water in the basin exceeded the global daily budget, all users could be satisfied without 
the need to limit anyone’s withdrawal. However, in the case of drought, the Army Corps 
of Engineers could cut daily permit allowances by an equal percentage for all users. 
 In 2002, ASCE published Riparian Water Regulation (Eheart, 2002), which 
provides a useful guide to developing a flexible permit system under the provision of 
regulated riparian statutes. Specifically, the document elaborates the algorithm for the 
fractional permitting system and comments that the system is more consistent with the 
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Riparian Doctrine’s fundamental concept of sharing water than a priority based permit 
system. Further, the system saves the administrative efforts of determining the priority for 
each individual user. No user is ever entirely deprived of water as long as the flow in the 
river does not go below the minimum flow standard. 
Several studies have demonstrated the advantages of the fractional flow approach 
in terms of economic benefit, administrative convenience and protection of stream 
ecosystems. Burness and Quirk (1979) and Wong and Eheart (1983) show, using 
economic models, that an equal sharing system produces a higher value of output than an 
appropriative system under every possible streamflow condition. Their mathematical 
deduction further suggests that a free market built upon an appropriative system would 
ultimately produce an equilibrium that resembles the equal sharing allocation. Recent 
studies (An and Eheart, 2006; An et al., 2004; An, 2004) conducted based on a Illinois 
watershed show that the fractional flow permit program that controls withdrawal based 
on flows measured at a downstream gage would require less regulatory operation and 
cause less ecologically damaging flow interruption than a fixed-flow permit program. 
  To date, most publications envisioning the fractional flow permit program, 
especially those involving quantitative modeling, tie the allowable withdrawals to 
readings at a single gage. Even most of the irrigation districts using proportional sharing 
under the Appropriative doctrine draw water from a single point of the river, thus tying 
the amount of water they have to distribute to that single point, whether gauged or not. 
This program needs to be modified to deal with a multiple gage system. Eheart and Lyon 
(1983) introduced an algorithm to extend the fractional flow permit to a multi-gage 
system. The algorithm, demonstrated by the authors through a single hypothetical case, 
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determines the users’ allowable withdrawals based on pre-defined individual fractional 
permits, the flow measured at the outlet of the stream, and the spatial distribution of 
water availability within the watershed. The authors, however, did not give a generalized 
procedure for the algorithm to be applied under any condition. Mathematical 
formulations for the algorithm were also not provided. 
Harrison (1991) proposed a so-called New Riparian program, which can achieve 
equitable flow sharing among users in a lotic system (which here means one in which, in 
contrast to a lentic system, water cannot naturally flow in an upstream direction to meet 
allocations). The core of the program is an algorithm which determines the allocation 
through a series of proportional dividing operations. The program does not explicitly 
define a fraction for each user. Instead, the program uses a feature of all users (optimal 
economic benefit in his case) as the common ground for the proportional dividing 
operations. Hence, the actual fraction each user can take from the local stream is not a 
constant, but rather a function of the spatial distribution of both water supply and demand. 
Harrison’s program is a more generalized flexible water rights system than the single-
gage fractional flow permitting. It is equivalent to the single-gage fractional flow sharing 
only when the system is constrained only by the most downstream gage.  
Another approach to flexible permit programs for a lotic system is to tie the 
allowable withdrawals to the local flow measurements at one or more upstream and/or 
downstream points. Harrison (1991) introduced a program called ‘Function of Local 
Streamflow’, which calculates users’ allowable withdrawals as a prescrbed function of 
the streamflows measured just upstream of their withdrawal points. The study shows the 
feasibility of the program based on economic, fairness, and practical criteria. In a water 
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allocation study conducted of an agricultural watershed in Illinois, Wollmuth and Eheart 
(2000) also showed that a program tying withdrawals to streamflow measured at a 
downstream gauge could provide higher economic efficiency than that achieved in the 
absence of any withdrawal regulation. 
 
2.4 Market for Tradable Withdrawal Permit under Regulated Riparianism 
 As a theoretically attractive and practically sound mechanism for water allocation, 
market-based transfer of water rights has been widely studied for decades (see, e.g., 
Anderson and Hill, 1997). Many believe that water markets can provide opportunities to 
transfer water from low-value to high-value uses, creating a win-win outcome for both 
the sellers and buyers. As a result, water rights transfer will increase the aggregate social 
net benefit. At the same time, however, existing discussions also point out that the 
establishment of water markets is often hindered by issues associated with high 
transaction costs and externalities (often referred to as third-party impacts). The strengths 
and weaknesses of water markets have been extensively discussed in the existing 
literature (Dinar et al., 1997; Lund and Israel, 1995; Brajer et al., 1989; Howe et al., 1986; 
Dellapenna, 2000). 
 The Riparian Doctrine has long been criticized for obstructing the transfer of 
water rights (Milliman, 1959). The common law system and the restriction thereof on the 
location of water uses create a major legal barrier to such transfers. Even without such 
restriction, the poorly defined water rights under the reasonable use theory would make it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to form a water market and a pricing mechanism. 
Historically, water transfers from riparian land to nonriparian land have happened 
occasionally in the traditional common-law states as a result of the balance of interests by 
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the courts (Butler, 1985; Tarlock, 2002). However, it is unclear how much the buyers can 
actually benefit in such transactions. Some courts have concluded that the buyer obtains 
no rights against riparians other than the seller (Dellapenna, 2002). In other words, the 
transaction creates for the buyer a privilege only against the seller, but not any other 
riparian right holder. 
 Market transfer of water rights has been widely practiced in the western states of 
the United States for decades. In the East, the rapid growth of new water demands and 
emergence of regulated riparianism have created opportunities for institutional reforms in 
favor of market transfer of water rights. Regulated riparianism provides clear definition 
to a withdrawal permit, which makes it possible to reallocate the permit if a better use 
exists, and thus, to define a marketable commodity. This approach also imposes no 
restrictions on the location of permits, and therefore reduces barriers confronting 
nonriparian uses under the traditional Riparian Doctrine, thus providing greater security 
than traditional riparianism (Gould, 1998). 
To reflect the emerging needs for water rights transfers, the Regulated Riparian 
Model Water Code charges the administering agency to encourage permit transfers 
(Dellapenna, 1997; ASCE, 2004) among permit holders. The publication Riparian Water 
Regulation (Eheart, 2002) further provides detailed guidance on the regulatory 
procedures for the management of water transfer activities. As of 1998, 18 of the 31 
eastern states had known regulations to manage intra- and inter-basin water transfers 
(Flood and Wright, 1998). 
It should, however, be noted that although regulated riparianism appears to 
provide great opportunities for water market development, it is not without problem. 
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Gould (1998) points out that the bureaucracies involved in and the temporal limitations 
imposed on the permits under regulated riparianism may create barriers to the 
development of an effective water market. Dellapenna (2000, 2004) even argues that the 
‘public good’ property of water makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to create a true 
water rights market under a regulated riparian system. 
 As the academic community is still debating the feasibility of water rights market 
in the traditionally riparian states, a water rights market as a practical means of water 
reallocation has taken place in several eastern states. In Georgia, for example, there now 
exist both wholesale and retail water markets (Isley and Middleton, 2003). Both 
interbasin and intrabasin water transfers have been considered in Georgia’s future water 
resource planning (Georgia State Water Council, 2007). In North Carolina and Florida, 
water transactions through informal markets between small agricultural users or land 
developers have been observed (See 
http://sogweb.sog.unc.edu/Water/index.php/Water_market). 
 The benefit of a water market in the context of the eastern states has been 
illustrated by a small number of modeling studies. Wong and Eheart (1983) show, 
through a case study in an agricultural watershed in Illinois, that a system with 
marketable water rights permits can capture about 95% of the optimal economic value of 
the water allocation system, while two alternative systems with non-marketable permits 
captured only 84% and 53% of the optimal value, respectively. An (2004) simulated 
water transfer through a perfect market for single-gage, multiple-user agricultural water 
allocation system. The study shows that whether the initial allocation is made by the 
fixed-flow permit system or the fractional-flow permit system, the free market based 
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reallocation would make small but consistent improvement in the aggregate net benefit. 
Saleth et al. (1991) discover that the choice of bargaining rules is important in a thin (less 
than 20 players) spot water market under a riparian rights permit system. Their simulation 
suggests that appropriate design of bargaining rules can affect players’ bargaining 
strategy and reduce social efficiency loss due to the thinness of the water market. In 
general Saleth et al. (1991) confirm the findings of many of the other investigators cited 
above, which is that centralized markets, with good communication among potential 
buyers and sellers, result in greater efficiency of allocation of water rights than do 
isolated two-party trades. 
Nowadays, economic development in the eastern states keeps creating spatial and 
temporal disparity between water demand and supply. There needs to be a system that 
allows for the reasonable transfer of water rights to bridge the gaps between supply and 
demand in order to maintain a sustainable economic growth. Despite the philosophical, 
practical, and legal obstacles to water marketing, water rights markets are expected to 
grow in the traditionally water-rich states in the 21st Century (Huffman, 2004; Neuman, 
2004). 
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CHAPTER 3. WATER ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AND THE MODELS 
THAT SIMULATE THEM 
 
 
 A water allocation mechanism is a set of rules that determines how water from all 
available sources is distributed among withdrawers in order to achieve one or more 
economic, social, and/or environmental goals. A water allocation mechanism can be 
implemented through certain policy program executed by a water authority. Throughout 
this thesis, the terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘program’ are used interchangeably. 
In this chapter, I first introduce five alternative water allocation mechanisms 
based on different underlying regulatory philosophies. These allocation mechanisms are : 
1) the Benefit Maximizing (MaxBen) program, based on the principle of maximizing 
economic benefit, 2) the Proportionally Fair (ProFair) program, based on the principle of 
equitable sharing, 3) the Downstream Priority (DPrio) and 4) the Upstream Priority with 
Municipal and Industrial User Privilege (UMIPrio) programs, both based on the principle 
of prioritization according to type of use and/or geographical location, and 5) the No-
Rule (NR) program, based on the principle of minimal regulation.. Two criteria, the total 
aggregate net benefit and the Equity Index are introduced as the measurements to 
evaluate the performance of the programs. Optimization models are developed to 
simulate the five withdrawal rules in terms of allocations to the users. An additional 
model is developed that incorporates a water market, using the results of the allocation 
model as the initial allocation. 
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3.1 Conceptualization of Water Allocation Systems 
 In surface water allocation studies, water sources, sinks, and channels are often 
conceptualized into a simplified network system. In this study, a water allocation system 
is seen as a dendritic, unidirectional network consisting of zones and control points. 
Control points are river cross-sections where streamflows are measured or regulated, such 
as gages, reservoir inlets and outlets, divisions of administrative districts, etc. Zones are 
river segments or water storages confined by immediate upstream and downstream 
control points. Each zone receives water from its upstream neighboring zone(s), interacts 
with local hydrologic processes (runoff, groundwater, ET, etc.), distributes water to local 
users, and then passes the remaining water to downstream zones. For the analysis in this 
thesis, no return flow (water returned to the stream by users) is considered. This 
assumption is tantamount to defining the withdrawal rights as consumption rights, thus 
giving users full credit for any return flows. The complication introduced by return flow 
is discussed quantitatively later in this Chapter.  
Shown in Figure 3.1 is an example of the conceptualized water allocation network 
described above. This is a simple allocation network consisting of 3 zones divided by 3 
gages. Each zone serves only one user and the local water budgets are consolidated into 
one water input per zone. 
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User1
 
 
3.2 Benefit Maximizing Allocation 
 The Benefit Maximizing (MaxBen) mechanism assumes that there exists a water 
authority, which has perfect knowledge about the benefit function for every user and the 
capability of coordinating and regulating all withdrawal activities. As its name suggests, 
the mechanism seeks to maximize the aggregate economic net benefit of all users within 
the allocation system. The MaxBen allocation can be determined by the following 
optimization model: 
    Max. ∑
i
ii xNB )(      (3.1.a) 
  Subject to 
    Ax ≤ Q - e      (3.1.b) 
    xi ≥ 0  for all i 
Gage 1 
Gage 2 
Gage 3 
Zone 1 
Zone 2
Zone 3
User2
User3
q1 
x1 
 q3 
x3 
x2 
q2 
Figure 3.1  A three-zone, three-user water allocation system, with 
local water input q and withdrawal x. 
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where x is the vector of water withdrawals to be determined by the model, xi is an 
element of x and denotes the amount of water allocated to user i, NBi(xi) is the net benefit 
function of user i, A is called water availability matrix, and Q is the vector of streamflows 
at all control points before any withdrawal takes place, and e is the vector of in-stream 
flow requirements for environmental protection at all control points. Representation 
(3.1.b) is called the water availability constraint, which is essentially a water balance 
constraint that limits the total withdrawal upstream of any control point to be less than the 
total available streamflow at that point. For conciseness, the right-hand side of the 
constraint can be replaced by a single vector Qa, which represents the streamflows that 
are available for allocation at the control points. 
 For an allocation network without return flow, the water availability matrix A is a 
0-1 matrix. If the system is also dendritic with unidirectional flow, then A is a triangular 
0-1 matrix, in which the upper right elements are always zero, the main diagonal 
elements are all 1, and the lower left elements may be zero or 1, depending on the spatial 
relationships of withdrawal points to gauges. For instance, the water availability matrix 
for the system in Figure 3.1 is . For a retrospective analysis using existing 
streamflow data, constraint (3.1.b) for this system is written as: 
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which in effect consists of 3 separate constraints. For a predictive analysis where 
streamflows are yet unknown, one can predict local water budgets for every zone using 
hydrologic models, and then calculate Q as: 
    Q = A(g – l) 
where g and l are the vectors consisting of water gains and losses in all individual zones, 
respectively. 
 For cases where return flow is considered, the water availability constraint takes a 
more complicated form. A will still be a triangular matrix, but its elements are no longer 
0-1 binary. Instead, the values of the elements would be fractions between zero and one, 
depending on the fractions of withdrawals the users return to the river. 
 Since economic efficiency is the only consideration in the MaxBen program, its 
allocation result sets a bench mark as the greatest economic value an allocation program 
can possibly achieve. This benchmark serves as a basis for evaluating the economic 
efficiency of the other programs. 
3.3 Proportionally Fair Allocation 
 The Proportionally Fair (ProFair) mechanism is grounded on the notion that under 
the Common Law framework, river flow should be shared among riparian users in 
proportion to their reasonable demands, regardless of their purposes of use. Different 
from MaxBen, the ProFair mechanism stresses on equity among withdrawers, leaving 
economic outcome a secondary consideration. Economic efficiency is maximized subject 
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to the realization of fair allocation, which, in this case, incorporates a notion of 
proportional sharing. 
3.3.1 The Proportional Fairness Criterion 
For users having equal access to a single water body, it is easy to calculate each 
user’s share by a proportional division. However, for multi-tributary river system with 
spatially distributed water inputs and outputs, it is not so straightforward to decide each 
user’s share based on a simple proportional rule. For example, suppose the users in 
Figure 3.1 have the same water demand of 5 m3/s, and the available flows are 1, 5, and 9 
m3/s at gages 1, 2, and 3, respectively. If we calculate the allowable share for the three 
users according to a simple proportional rule with respect to the outlet flow, then each 
user is allowed to withdrawal 3 m3/s. However, this allocation is infeasible because it is 
impossible for user 1 to get 3 m3/s since the locally available flow in zone 1 is only 1 
m3/s. The allocation can be made feasible by reducing user 1’s withdrawal to 1 m3/s and 
maintaining the 3 m3/s withdrawal by users 2 and 3. However, the system would in that 
case produce 2 m3/s of unused water, which was accessible, but not granted to user 2 and 
3. Obviously, a more reasonable solution in this case would be to keep user 1 with 1 m3/s 
and allot 4 m3/s each to users 2 and 3. In this way, the allocation is still fair, because the 
allocation is proportional insofar as the supply in the stream allows, and the increase in 
user 2 and 3’s shares does not cause any damage to user 1. At the same time, the overall 
economic efficiency is also improved, since no water is wasted.  
The 3-gage system is simple, but the more important question here is whether the 
solution to this simple system can be extended to a general system. In other words, given 
a water allocation network as described in Section 3.1, does there exist a general solution 
 
 
34
that can maximize the proportional sharing among competing users, while making sure 
that no water is wasted? Further, if such solution exists, how do we find it? 
Now consider a system with multiple gages and users. Assume that any user i in 
this system has an initial water entitlement of mi, which is the maximum allowable 
withdrawal initially granted by the water authority, and an allocated withdrawal of xi, 
which is the actual amount of water the user receives under a given water availability 
condition. The values of mi could be determined by the user’s optimal demand or on 
some other basis dependent on the user’s characteristics.  
Here, it is assumed that streamflows don’t change with time, so that allocations 
may be made on a static basis, without considering channel lag times. While factually 
incorrect, this assumption is justified if changes in streamflow are slow in comparison to 
the residence time of the channel system, which, by and large, is the case here. 
It is discovered by this study that under a water availability condition given by 
(3.1.b) there exists a unique allocation that satisfies the Proportional Fairness Criterion, 
which is defined as follows: 
      An allocation x* is called proportionally fair if for any other feasible 
allocation x, the following relationship holds: 
   0*
*
≤−∑
i i
ii
i x
xxm         (3.2) 
If we define the ratio  
i
i
i m
x≡φ       (3.3) 
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to be the degree of water supply satisfaction received by user i, then the Proportional 
Fairness Criterion can be written as 
    0*
*
≤−∑
i i
ii xx
φ         (3.4) 
where 
i
i
i m
x** =φ  represents the water supply satisfaction of user i resulting from the 
proportionally fair allocation. This criterion implies that any change made to the 
proportionally fair allocation will incur a loss from some user whose degree of 
satisfaction is equal or already smaller than that of those who benefit from the change. In 
other words, at the proportionally fair allocation no user can be better off without 
damaging some one else who is equally or already less well off. 
The Proportional Fairness Criterion was first discovered by electrical engineers. 
Over the past few decades, extensive research has been conducted in the field of design 
and control of electronic communication networks. One of the key issues in this field is 
the allocation of limited bandwidth among competing data transfer requests. The 
Proportional Fairness Criterion was first introduced by Frank Kelley and his colleagues 
(Kelley, 1997; Kelley et al., 1998) in the late 1990s. In their research, they tried to 
develop a scheme that can perform fair and robust allocation of data transferring capacity 
among competing users in a network, subject to dynamic bandwidth availability. They 
discovered that a system optimum is achieved when the users’ choices of payment and 
the network’s choice of bandwidth allocation are in equilibrium with each other. This 
particular equilibrium is captured precisely by the Proportional Fairness Criterion. The 
present study finds that a proportionally fair allocation can also be found in an allocation 
network with dentritic, unidirectional and loop-free water geometry. 
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Although governed by very different physical principles, electronic 
communication networks are similar to water allocation networks in many ways. For 
example, bandwidth follows the same ‘mass balance’ rule as water – the total bandwidth 
is equal to the sum of fractions occupied by individual users in the network at any 
moment. For another example, bandwidth, often greater than 106 bytes per second in 
capacity, can be largely considered as continuous substance like water, assuming one 
byte per second to be the smallest discrete unit. Besides, the dentritic, unidirectional, 
loop-free networks of water allocation systems discussed in this study can be viewed as a 
subset of the more complicated electronic communication networks. There is, however, a 
noted difference between the two types of networks in that there can be return flow 
(water that is not consumed by users and hence returned to the system) presented in a 
water allocation system while there is no such thing as ‘return bandwidth’ in a 
communication network – there cannot be a user requesting and releasing bandwidth at 
the same time. Whether the Proportional Fairness Criterion still applies when return 
flows are present is a question subject to further investigation and is not addressed in the 
current study.  
The proportionally fair allocation has another important property – given a 
qualified network, it is unique (see proof in Appendix 3A). This property is useful from a 
regulatory point of view, but more importantly, it is critical in developing the methods to 
find this allocation. 
 The following sections introduce two approaches for locating the proportionally 
fair solution for a given water allocation system: 1) the concave optimization approach 
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and 2) the ‘Bottleneck’ Algorithm. It is proved in Appendix A that the two approaches 
are equivalent to each other. 
3.3.2 Convex Optimization Approach 
 With slight modification of the work of Kelley (1996) and Kelley et al. (1998), 
the following log-linear-programming model is used to obtain the proportionally fair 
allocation for a raw water supply system: 
    ∑
i
ii xm lnmax      (3.5.a) 
  Subject to 
          Ax ≤ Qa      (3.5.b) 
  Over        xi ≥ 0 
where mi is user i's entitled water right, which is initially granted by a water authority and 
xi is the actually amount of withdrawal the user is allowed to take under a given set of 
water availability conditions.  The notations A and Qa are defined the same as in the 
MaxBen model (3.1). Given the strict convexity of the objective function and the linear 
nature of the constraints, model (3.5) is guaranteed to have a convex decision space and a 
unique solution. 
 In an electronic communication network setting, model (3.5) requires that the 
network is congested (total supply less than total demand) in order to find the 
proportionally fair solution. A similar requirement holds for water allocation systems: 
there should be a shortage of water supply in order for model (3.5) to produce the true 
proportionally fair allocation among competing withdrawers. For a system where supply 
may exceed demand, one more set of constraints should be added: 
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    xi ≤ xi, opt for all i    (3.5.c) 
where xi, opt represents the optimal amount of water user i would take if streamflow were 
unlimitedly available. When constraint (3.5.c) is binding for some i, we call the solution a 
practical allocation, since the allocation has in practice satisfied a subset of users and 
therefore it is no longer necessary to pursue the Proportional Fair Allocation for the entire 
system. 
 A general proof of the proportional fairness of the solution by model (3.5) is 
given in Appendix A. Here we demonstrate the model effectiveness using the simple 
numerical example shown in Figure 3.1. 
 Again, we suppose that the three users have a common water demand (or water 
rights entitlement) of 5 units each. The locally produced runoff of the 3 zones is r = (1, 4, 
4), implying the available streamflows at the 3 control points to be Qa = (1, 5, 9). Model 
(3.5) for this simple system is then written as 
   max. 5ln(x1) + 5ln(x2) + 5ln(x3) 
Subject to:          
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   x1 ≤ 5, x2 ≤ 5, x3 ≤ 5 
Over   x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0 
Using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions we find the solution to be x = (1, 4, 4), 
i.e. user 1 withdraws the entire 1 unit local flow, user 2 takes 4 units and passes down 1 
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unit, and user 3 receives 4 units with 3 from local runoff and 1 from upstream input. It is 
easy to demonstrate numerically that this solution satisfies the Proportional Fairness 
Criterion given by (3.2). In this case, the constraints associated with control points 1 and 
3 are binding. 
If, for another example, the local runoff is r = (3.5, 4, 1.5) and corresponding 
available flow Qa = (3.5, 4, 9), then the solution becomes x = (3, 3, 3), which also 
satisfies the Proportional Fairness Criterion. The new proportionally fair solution is 
different from the one in the previous example, because the feasible space has changed 
due to the change in flow availability. In this case, only the water availability constraint 
associated with control point 3 is binding. 
 The form of the objective function for the convex optimization model is not 
unique. For example, the current study finds that the following quadratic objective 
function is equally able to elicit the Proportionally Fair solution to the water allocation 
network as the Kelly’s logarithmic objective function: 
   ∑ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
i
i
i
i xm
x 2
2
1 max.      (3.6) 
It is easy to verify that objective function (3.6) yields the same results for the 
examples above. 
3.3.3 Bottle Neck Algorithm 
 Neither the convex programming model nor the Proportional Fairness Criterion is 
very intuitive to understand, because from a water resource manager’s standpoint, neither 
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of them provides any allocation rules. It would be helpful if there is a set of explanatory 
and operable rules that can lead to the Proportionally Fair Allocation. 
 In his master’s thesis, Harrison (1990) proposed a so-called ‘New Riparian 
Program’ as a potential water allocation mechanism for the Eastern U.S. Under that 
program, water allotments for users along a waterway system are determined using an 
algorithm consisting of a series of iterative steps. With modification, the algorithm is 
reintroduced in this study as follows: 
1) Starting from natural flow conditions, increasingly allocate water in the 
entire system in proportion to the users’ initial entitlement until a 
constraining point, where available flow becomes zero, is encountered. 
2) Maintain all the withdrawals upstream of the constraining point at their 
present level.  
3) Continue the proportional allocation process for the remaining 
unconstrained system until the next constraining point is encountered. 
4) Repeat steps 2) and 3) until all available water in the system has been 
allocated, or until all the remaining users are fully satisfied. 
 
Because the algorithm progresses as if it is looking for a series of bottlenecks in a 
water supply system, it is named in this dissertation the Bottleneck Algorithm. The 
Bottleneck Algorithm is in its nature a greedy algorithm, which seeks to reach a global 
solution by a series of short-sighted sub-optimization actions at each iterative step. It 
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minimizes “waste” (unused release through the watershed outlet) under a proportional 
sharing restriction. 
The Bottleneck Algorithm breaks down the allocation problem into a series of 
successive sub-problems. At the very first iteration, the solution is obtained by solving 
the following linear optimization problem: 
    max ∑
∈Si
ix       (3.7.a) 
   s.t. 
    Ax ≤ Qa      (3.7.b) 
    φ=
i
i
m
x
 for all i    (3.7.c) 
    10 ≤≤ φ       (3.7.d) 
    xi ≥ 0   for all i, 
where S represents the set of all users within the allocation system, mi is the pre-defined 
water entitlement for user i, φ is the common proportion, i.e. degree of water supply 
satisfaction, to be achieved in this iteration. 
 By substituting (3.7.c) into (3.7.a) and (3.7.b), we can eliminate x from the 
problem: 
    Max φ       (3.8.a) 
   s.t. 
    φAm ≤ Qa       (3.8.b) 
    10 ≤≤ φ       (3.8.c) 
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where m is the water entitlement vector, consisting of all mi’s. The new problem has only 
one decision variable, φ. The goal becomes to find the maximal water satisfaction that 
can be achieved by every user without violating the water balance constraints. By the 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we know that under general situations there should be 
one and only one binding constraint in a feasible one-variable linear programming 
problem. In this case, if (3.8.c) is not binding, then the binding constraint must be the one 
associated with the bottleneck point, where the streamflow is most limiting. Thus, the 
solution to the first iteration is 
   
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
= ∑
∈
∈ 1,minmin*
)(
,
jUi
i
ja
Sj m
Qφ      (3.9) 
where U(j) is called subsystem j, defined as the set of users that are upstream of and 
including user j, and Qa,j is the available flow at gage j if no withdrawal were to take 
place.  
 After the initial iteration, the following iterations can be written in a similar 
mathematical form for the remaining unconstrained part of the system. In general, at the 
kth iteration the problem is written as 
    Max φ(k)      (3.10.a) 
   s.t. 
                   (3.10.b) )()()( kkk aQmA ≤φ
       (3.10.c) )1()2()1()( ...10 φφφφ −−−−≤≤ −− kkk
where A(k) is the water availability matrix associated with the remaining subsystem at the 
kth iteration, Qa(k) is the vector of the remaining available flow associated with the 
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remaining system at the kth iteration, m is still the water rights entitlement vector, and φ(k) 
is the incremental water supply satisfaction obtained by the remaining users at the kth 
iteration. For the users cleared in the kth round, the final water satisfaction ratio they 
receive, denoted as Φk, is calculated as  
Φk = φ(1) + φ(2) +…+ φ(k)     (3.11) 
and the corresponding volumes of water they are allowed to withdraw are the products of  
their individual water entitlements and the above summation. 
 The mathematical representations above will help in the proof for the equivalence 
between the Bottleneck Algorithm and the Proportionally Fair Allocation (See Appendix 
3A). 
 Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate a hypothetical 10-gage free-flowing allocation 
system and how the Bottleneck Algorithm is applied to achieve a proportionally fair 
allocation in the system. In this case, allocation is completed in 6 iterations. Each plot of 
figure 3.2 represents the ending status of one iteration. The numbers in the arrow boxes 
are the remaining available flows that have not been allocated by end of the current step. 
In the rectangular boxes, the first number is the cumulative volume of water that has been 
allotted to the users by end of the current step, and the second number is the associated 
degree of water supply satisfaction defined by (3.3). The gage that presents the bottleneck 
(where available streamflow becomes zero) found in the current step is indicated by a 
hatched arrow. 
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Figure 3.2 A 10-gage dendritic water allocation network 
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Figure 3.3 Bottleneck Algorithm for water allocation in the 10-gage river system. 
Allocation is completed in 6 iterations.  
 
0 
10 
4.5 
23
38
33 
7.5
73 
16 
136 
4;0.25 
2;0.25 
3.5;0.25
7;0.25 
10;0.25
7.5;0.25
13;0.25 
2;0.25 
4;0.25 0 
4;0.5 
8 
8.8;0.25 
6;0.25 
1 
16
21 
18.5
0 
36
14
76.5
7;0.5 
14;0.5 
20;0.5 
15;0.5 
25;0.5 
18.5;0.5 
12;0.5 
4;0.5 
0 
7.4 
0 
14
16.1
14.4 
0 
27.6 
13.4 
62 
4;0.25 
4.6;0.57
8;0.57 
16;0.57
22.9;0.57
15;0.5 
28.5;0.57 
4.6;0.57 
20;0.57 
13.7;0.57 
0 
5.6 
0 
7.5
0.3 
4.4
0 
0
11.6
16.6
4;0.25 
6.5;0.81
8;0.57 
22.7;0.81
32.4;0.81
15;0.5 
40.5;0.81 
6.5;0.81 
28.4;0.81 
19.4;0.81
0 
4.7 
0 
7.5
0.3
0 
0 
0 
10.7 
9 
4;0.25 
7.3;0.91
8;0.57 
22.7;0.81
32.4;0.81
15;0.5 
40.5;0.81 
7.3;0.91 
31.9;0.91 
21.8;0.91 
0 
4.7 
0 
7.5
0.3 
0
0 
0 
10
6 
4;0.25 
7.3;0.91
8;0.57 
22.7;0.81
32.4;0.81
15;0.5 
40.5;0.81 
8;1 
31.9;0.91 
24;1 
Step 1 Step 2 
Step 4 Step 3 
Step 5 Step 6 
River segment where allocation is completed Remaining available flow by end of a step 10
River segment where allocation is not completed 7.3; 0.91 Allocated water and associated water 
supply satisfaction for each user 
‘Bottleneck’ point 
 
 
46
 Several characteristics of the Bottleneck Algorithm can be observed from this 
example. First, in any branch of the dendritic stream network, the allocation always 
progresses from upstream to downstream. The most downstream user of the entire system 
remains in the unconstrained part of the system till the last iteration. Second, the 
remaining system is always dendritic at any iteration. Thus, model (3.10) can always be 
seen as a simpler version of model (3.8) and has a solution with the form similar to (3.9). 
Third, the degree of satisfaction of a downstream user is always no less than its upstream 
peers. Finally and the most importantly, in the Bottleneck Algorithm solution, a user 
cannot receive more water to achieve a higher degree of satisfaction without damaging 
some other(s) whose degree of satisfaction is equal or already lower, which is consistent 
with the definition of the proportionally fair allocation. This suggests that every user has 
maximized his or her share without taking any advantage of others, which forms a ground 
of fairness for the Bottleneck Algorithm. 
 
3.3.4 Comments 
Although Harrison (1990) successfully developed the initial form of the 
Bottleneck Algorithm, he did not explain why this allocation scheme is particularly 
significant to water resource management. The introduction of the Proportional Fairness 
Criterion in the late 1990s and the proof in this dissertation that the Bottleneck Algorithm 
generates the Proportionally Fair Allocation provides a compelling answer to the question. 
The proportionally fair allocation provides an objective and qualitative benchmark for 
fair sharing of water among competing users. 
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Both the convex programming approach and the Bottleneck Algorithm have their 
own advantages. The convex programming approach offers a concise representation for 
the problem. With the computerized spreadsheet technology today, water resource 
managers can easily set up the convex programming model for a large allocation network 
and quickly find the proportionally fair solution without going through all the iterative 
steps, which can be tedious when the system becomes large. Hence, from a manager’s 
point of view, the convex programming approach is more convenient and efficient.  
However, from a modeler’s and a computer programmer’s point of view, the 
algorithm is equally important as the model, because the model itself does not 
automatically produce a result. The solution must be obtained through an algorithm 
composed of a series of simple computational procedures. This study shows that the 
Bottleneck Algorithm not only provides an explanatory procedure to produce the 
Proportionally Fair allocation, but also offers an effective numerical algorithm to solve a 
convex programming model with the form of (3.5) or (3.6). Compared with many 
existing numerical algorithms, the Bottleneck Algorithm is able to find the precise 
optimum in a finite number of simple actions, and can therefore achieve higher efficiency. 
It may be significant for future studies to explore further the forms of problems that can 
be solved by the Bottleneck Algorithm and its variations and to integrate the algorithm 
into the solver toolboxes in existing optimization software packages. 
It should be pointed out that the present study only proved the equivalence 
between the convex programming model and the Bottleneck Algorithm for a system 
without return flow. Further investigation is needed to study the performance of the two 
approaches for systems where return flow occurs. 
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3.4 Downstream Priority Allocation (DPrio) 
 The water rights reform in the Eastern US has more or less been influenced by 
strongly the Appropriation Doctrine, which is widely exercised in the western US. 
Several Eastern states have adopted or partially adopted some kind of prioritized 
permitting system (Knapp and Singh, 1985; Sherk, 1990; Foran, 1995) to address 
conflicting water demands in times of shortage. Hence, it is meaningful for this study to 
examine the performance of the priority-based allocation programs as alternative 
mechanisms for the Eastern states. 
 In a priority-based system, water rights are exercised in the order of priority 
ranking. In times of drought, users with lower priority ranks cannot withdraw any water 
until the users with higher ranks are fully satisfied. 
 The allocation outcome of a given river basin depends heavily on the how the user 
priorities are assigned, which, depending on the water rights history and policy 
arrangements, can be quite variable. As the number of users in the system increases, the 
number of possible priority sequences increases factorially (a system with n users can 
have n! possible priority sequences). Although many of these sequences will likely be 
equivalent to each other for a particular allocation system, the variability of possible 
outcomes is still prohibitively large, which poses a challenge to the present analysis. It is 
not only extremely time-consuming, but also unnecessary to investigate every single case 
of such priority programs. Instead, this study is focused only on three priority 
arrangements of particular practical significance.  
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These three programs are 1) Downstream Priority (DPrio), 2) No Rule (NR), 
which can be viewed as upstream priority, and 3) Upstream Priority with Municipal and 
Industrial User Privilege (UMIPrio). 
 The Downstream Priority mechanism is based on the arrangement where the 
water rights priorities are granted in the order of closeness to the outlet of the river basin. 
The farther downstream a user is located, the higher priority he or she is entitled to. The 
DPrio program can be represented by the following linear optimization problem: 
    ∑
i
ii xωmax      (3.12.a) 
  Subject to 
    Ax ≤ Qa     (3.12.b) 
    0 ≤ xi ≤ xi, opt for all i   (3.12.c) 
where wi is the weight that reflects the priority of user i. The weights can be assigned 
arbitrarily as long as they satisfy: 
    ωi > ωj  for any i downstream of j.  (3.12.d) 
Because of the linear feature of the objective function, available water will go first to the 
user with the highest weight and then the subsequent ones in order of decreasing weight. 
3.5 ‘No-Rule’ Allocation (NR) 
 The ‘No-Rule’ (NR) mechanism reflects the situation where withdrawals are 
subject to minimal regulation and users can withdraw water based largely on their free 
will. Depending on water availability, a user can withdrawal either the amount of water 
that maximizes his net benefit or all available water that is flowing through his or her 
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local reach, whichever smaller. Hence, the NR allocation is by its nature equivalent to an 
upstream-advantage or upstream-priority program, which to some degree reflexes the 
current situations in the eastern states with weak or no surface water rights regulation. 
 The model that simulates the NR allocation has the same form as the DPrio model: 
    ∑
i
ii xωmax       (3.13.a) 
  Subject to 
    Ax ≤ Qa      (3.13.b) 
    0 ≤ xi ≤ xi, opt for all i    (3.13.c) 
However, the weights are assigned opposite to those in the DPrio program. The upstream 
users always receive higher weights than their downstream peers: 
    ωi > ωj  for any i upstream of j.  (3.13.d) 
This is because water is available to upstream users before it flows to downstream users. 
In order to compare the selected programs on the same quantitative basis, this study 
assumes that the NR program still needs to comply with the minimal in-stream flow 
standard. Thus, the available flow vector Qa in (3.13.b) is the same as in (3.12.b). 
 
3.6 Upstream Priority with Municipal and Industrial User Privilege (UMIPrio) 
 Many Eastern States have adopted some form of priority programs based on types 
of water use (see the Literature Review chapter for examples). The UMIPrio program is 
developed to address arrangements of such kind. The program ranks users first based on 
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their types of use, and then on their locations. In this study, we are particularly interested 
in two types of users, municipal/industrial (M&I) and agricultural, with the priority given 
to the former. Within each type, the users are then ranked in order of ‘upstreamness’. 
 The model that simulates the UMIPrio program takes the same form as the one for 
the DPrio and NR programs (3.12), except that the weights are assigned differently. In 
this case, if i and j are M&I and agricultural users, respectively, then ωi > ωj. If i and j are 
of same type, then ωi > ωj if i is upstream of j. 
 
3.7 Analysis of Market-based Water Rights Transfer 
 The idea of water rights market is simple: users are allowed to buy others’ or sell 
their own existing water rights to increase profitability. There may be situations where a 
water market works as a primary allocation mechanism, such as permit auction programs 
directed by regulators (Wong and Eheart, 1983). But more often, a water market is a 
secondary mechanism, which reallocates existing water rights holdings through voluntary 
transactions between buyers and sellers. The result of the water market is often an 
increased aggregate net benefit from a group of individually based buying and selling 
decisions. 
The purpose of the present trading analysis is to evaluate the physical and 
economic outcomes of a water market based on different initial allocation mechanisms. 
The analysis is particularly concerned with an idealized free market where prices are 
determined purely by supply-demand conditions, assuming that third party effects and 
transaction costs are minimal. Several quantitative characteristics of the water market are 
simulated, including the amount of water transferred, the total revenue of water rights 
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sale, the prices at which water is sold, and the aggregate gain in net benefit (or total profit) 
of the entire system. 
In a water market, equilibrium is reached when no more voluntary exchanges can 
increase the total aggregate profit of all buyers and sellers. At this equilibrium the 
aggregate net benefit of the entire market is maximized. Thus, the trading activities in a 
water market can be simulated by the following optimization model: 
   Max. [ ]∑ −−+
i
iitiitiii tctptxNB ,,,0 )(    (3.14.a) 
  Subject to 
    A(x0 + t) ≤ Qa      (3.14.b) 
where x0,i is the known pre-market allocation to user i, ti is the amount of water transfer to 
be determined by user i, pt,i is the direct purchase price for user i at which the water is 
transferred, and ct,i is the transaction cost , which is a collective result of all other costs 
associated with the transfer in addition to the direct purchase cost. Different from the 
initial allocation models where the decision variables can only take non-negative values, 
the decision variables t here can take either a positive value, indicating a buy, or a 
negative value, indicating a sale. 
Under idealized market conditions, the transaction cost term in (3.14.a) can be 
dropped. The aggregate amounts bought and sold always equal each other, so that the 
purchase costs cancel out in the aggregate formula: 
  [ ] ∑∑ +=−+
i
iii
i
iitiii txNBtptxNB )()( ,0,,0  
Therefore, the final allocation resulting from the market simulation model (3.14) 
is equivalent to the solution to the Benefit Maximizing model (3.1). Hence, t can be 
simply derived as 
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   t = xMB – x0      (3.15) 
where xMB is the benefit maximizing allocation and x0 is the initial allocation from a 
primary water withdrawal program, in this case one of the solutions to the ProFair, DPrio, 
UMIPrio, and NR programs. The aggregate gain in net benefit from the market program, 
denoted by G, can then be easily calculated by taking the difference between the 
aggregate net benefits of the MaxBen and any of the alternative programs: 
   ∑∑ −=
i
ii
i
iMBi xNBxNBG )()( ,0,     (3.16) 
 Water transfers can take various forms depending on their purposes and effective 
duration (Lund and Israel, 1995). As stated in Chapter 1, this study is mainly concerned 
with a ‘spot market’ where water rights are transferred or leased on a short-term basis 
(typically completed within a single water year) to meet immediate needs. Compared to 
some of the long-term to permanent transfer options, a spot market is considered to be 
more cost-effective in managing sporadic, short-term deficiencies (Characklis et al., 
2006), which are often of the greatest concern in the eastern United States. Chapter 4 will 
discuss the setup of spot market simulation in more details. 
 The pricing of water is slightly more complicated. Due to the physical constraints 
created by the geographical distribution of water inputs and the unidirectional feature of 
the river network, the users in the market do not have equal access to all supply. The 
more downstream a potential buyer is located, the better chance he or she has to find a 
seller. On the other hand, a user located near a headwater may find very limited buying 
opportunity on the market. Hence, the buying or selling opportunity (and therefore, price) 
is a function of the user’s location. 
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 In a free market, the prices should evolve such that the market can reach an 
equilibrium, where no further transfers are profitable. At this equilibrium, the buying or 
selling price for each user should be equal to his or her marginal water use benefit, which 
is determined by water availability. From basic microeconomic theories we know that the 
prices can be obtained by solving the Lagrange multipliers of the Benefit Maximizing 
problem (3.1) or, equivalently, the trading problem (3.14). 
 Let’s define the Lagrangian for problem (3.1) as 
   ∑ −+=
i
iaii QfL )()(),( ,xAxλx λ     (3.17) 
where x is the water allocation vector to be decided, f(x) denotes the net benefit 
maximizing objective function, ΣNBi(xi), λi is the Lagrange multiplier for constraint i 
associated with zone i, Ai is the ith row in the water availability matrix, a 0-1 vector, and 
Qa,i is the available flow through zone i. The solution to x* and λ* can be obtained by 
solving the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (Nocedal and Wright 
representations, 1999): 
          =∇ *)*,( λxLx 0      (3.18.a) 
    Aix* – Qa,i = 0    when constraint i is binding (3.18.b) 
    Aix* – Qa,i ≤ 0    when constraint i is not binding (3.18.c) 
                λi* ≥ 0    for all i    (3.18.d) 
        λi*( Aix* – Qa,i) = 0 for all i   (3.18.e) 
 The buying or selling price pt,i for user i would be equal to the Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the nearest downstream binding control point. The cost or 
revenue of the transfer related to user i would then be | pt,iti |, and the total revenue (T) 
generated by the entire market would be 
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since the amount of permits bought equals that sold. 
    
3.8 Measurement of Fairness 
 Traditionally, water allocation studies, conducted mostly in the context of the 
Western US, focus primarily on economic efficiency, attempting to design allocation 
programs that maximize economic benefit while satisfying various underlying hydrologic, 
operational, and policy constraints. As water scarcity emerges in the Eastern US, the 
interest of water allocation research is shifting toward the development of withdrawal 
programs that not only result in sound economic efficiency, but also achieve reasonable 
degree of fairness. Such shift of interest is largely driven by the legal reality of the 
eastern water rights, wherein the Riparian Doctrine, which in essence requires equitable 
sharing of water, remains the fundamental guidance for water policy development and 
engineering practices. 
 In this study, a dimensionless criterion called Equity Index (EI) is used to measure 
the degree of fairness achieved by selected water allocation mechanisms. The index is a 
modification from a similar concept introduced previously by Harrison (1990). The 
formula that calculates the index is: 
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where φi is user i’s satisfaction coefficient defined by the ratio of his or her allowable 
withdrawal over demand (Eq. (3.3)), φ  is the average satisfaction coefficient over all 
users, N is the total number of users in the allocation system. One can immediately notice 
that part of the above equation is equivalent to certain commonly used statistical 
parameters and hence can be simplified as 
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where σ(φ) and CV(φ) are the standard deviation and coefficient of variation of φi’s, 
respectively. 
 A property that makes EI a convenient measurement for fairness is that its value 
falls strictly between zero and one. An EI value of one indicates a perfectly equitable 
allocation, where all users receive exactly the same level of satisfaction. Conversely, an 
EI value of zero indicates a perfectly inequitable allocation, where water is allocated to 
only one user and nobody else (i.e. φ is some positive number for one user and zero for 
everybody else). In practice, this index can be used to evaluate and compare the degree of 
fairness achieved by alternative water allocation programs. 
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APPENDIX 3.A. Equivalence between Convex Programming Model and Bottleneck 
Algorithm in Producing Proportionally Fair Allocation 
 
To prove the equivalence between the convex programming model (3.4) and the 
Bottleneck Algorithm in producing the Proportionally Fair Allocation solution, we only 
need to prove the following propositions: 
1) The solution to the convex programming problem (3.4) satisfies the 
Proportional Fairness Criterion; 
2) The solution produced by the Bottleneck Algorithm also satisfies the 
Proportional Fairness Criterion; and 
3) For a given problem, the Proportionally Fair solution is unique. 
Proof for proposition 1: 
 Because the objective function of problem is ∑=
i
ii xmf ln)(x , the left hand side 
of the Proportional Fairness Criteria in this case can be written as 
   *)(*)(*
*
xxx f
x
xxm
i i
ii
i ∇⋅−=−∑  
where x* is the optimal solution to problem (3.5), x is any other feasible solution. Thus, 
to prove proposition 1 is true, we only need to show 
   0*)(*)( ≤∇⋅− xxx f       (A.1) 
First, we assume x is located in a sufficiently small neighborhood of x*. Since f(x) 
is continuously differentiable, by Taylor’s Theorem we have that 
  )*(*)(*)(*)()( xxxxxxx −+∇⋅−+= offf  
   *)(*)(*)( xxxx ff ∇⋅−+≈      (A.2) 
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Since x* is the maximizer of problem (3.5), it must be true that f(x) – f(x*) ≤ 0. Therefore, 
by rearranging (A.2) we get: 
   0*)()(*)(*)( ≤−=∇⋅− xxxxx fff    (A.3) 
 For any feasible solution y that is remote from x*, because of the convexity of the 
feasible space, we can always find a scalar τ and a feasible solution x within a 
sufficiently small neighborhood of x* that satisfies (A.2) (see Figure A.1) so that 
    y – x* = τ(x – x*)     (A.4) 
Thus 
  0*)(*)(*)(*)( *
*
≤−=∇⋅−=∇⋅− ∑
i i
ii
i x
xxmff ττ xxxxxy  
x*
x
y 
 
Figure A.1. In a convex space, any remote point y from the optimum x*  
is on the direction defined by the optimum and some nearby feasible point x 
 
Proof for proposition 2: 
 Without loss of generality, we suppose there is a system consisting of n zones, 
which can be allocated by the Bottleneck Algorithm in m steps to arrive at the 
Proportionally Fair Allocation. Readers should note that m is different from the notation 
for water rights entitlement mi. To prove the allocation is proportionally fair, we only 
need show the following: 
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where S is the set of all users in the allocation system, i.e. S = {1,2,…,n}, S(k) (k = 1, 2, …, 
m) is the set of users whose allocation is directly completed by step k, and Φk is the water 
supply satisfaction finally found for the users in S(k). By definition, we know that 
    ∀ i,j = 1, 2, …, k and i ≠ j  (A.6) nullSS ji =∩ )()(
        (A.7) SSSS m =∪∪∪ )()2()1( ...
Also by (3.11) we know that  
    0 < Φ1< Φ2 < … < Φm    (A.8) 
From the definition of the Bottleneck Algorithm, we know that there must be m 
bottlenecks in the system. In other words, of the constraints given by 
    Ax ≤ Qa      (A.9) 
there must be m of them that are binding. Thus, for any other allocation x ≠ x*, it must 
hold that: 
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where Ak is the kth row of the water availability matrix A, and Qa,k is the kth element in the 
available flow vector Qa. Particularly, when k = n  
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Otherwise, the move from x* to x will be infeasible by violating (A.9). Therefore, 
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The last inequality results from (A.7), (A.8), and (A.11). Proposition 2 is proved. 
 
Proof for proposition 3: 
 For proposition 3, we can use proof by contradiction. Suppose there is another 
allocation y ≠ x*, which satisfies the Proportional Fairness Criterion. Then by the 
definition of the Proportional Fairness Criterion, we have that: 
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Add (A.12) and (A.13) to get 
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By Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality, for any xi* >0 and yi >0, (A.14) holds only when xi* = yi 
for all i. Hence y must be equal to x*, which contradicts the earlier assumption. Therefore, 
y does not exist and the Proportionally Fair Allocation must be unique. 
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CHAPTER 4. WATER ALLOCATION PROGRAM EVALUATION – A CASE 
STUDY IN SANGAMON RIVER WATERSHED, IL 
 
4.1 Watershed Characteristics 
 The Sangamon River (Figure 4.1), located in Central Illinois, is a tributary to the 
Illinois River with a watershed area of about 14,040 km2. Located in a humid continental 
climate region, the Sangamon River watershed normally experiences warm (ca. 35 oC 
maximum), humid summers and cold, dry winters. Average annual precipitation is about 
970 mm. Average growing degrees day is about 1940 Celsius degrees, which is normally 
suitable for one crop per year. 
 
Figure 4.1 The Sangamon River Watershed in Illinois 
 
 
 The watershed is dominated by agricultural land with corn and soybeans 
cultivation (>90% of the basin area). Statistics (NASS, 2006) show that corn and soybean 
yields have both increased by about 5 fold from the 1930s to the early 21st century. There 
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are three major metropolitan areas in the watershed, Bloomington-Normal, Decatur, and 
Springfield, with populations of 76,000, 82000, and 108,000, respectively as of 2006. 
 Several reservoirs are located on the Sangamon River, serving the needs of 
municipal and industrial users. Reservoirs of prominence are Lake Decatur, Lake 
Springfield, and Clinton Lake. The first two are controlled reservoirs currently serving as 
drinking and industrial water supply for the cities of Decatur and Springfield. The third, 
with an uncontrolled spillway, provides cooling water for the Clinton Nuclear Power 
Plant, which returns about 99% of its withdrawal back to the lake.  
 Historically, the Sangamon River region has largely enjoyed abundant water 
resources. Irrigation practice is rare because rainfall is sufficient to meet the needs of the 
crops in normal years and the economic incentive is not strong enough to support a wide 
adoption of irrigation. As of 1995, total water withdrawal for irrigation in the Sangamon 
River watershed is about 14 mgd, or 0.61 m3/s (USGS, 1999).  
With limited irrigation, water demand comes mostly from non-agricultural sectors, 
including primarily commercial, residential, industrial, and thermoelectric power uses. 
The two largest municipal water supply reservoirs, Lake Decatur and Lake Springfield, 
support average withdrawals of 1.7 m3/s (39 mgd) and 1.2 m3/s (28 mgd), respectively 
(Makowski et al., 1986; Keefer and Bauer, 2005). 
 Because of the lack of irrigation facilities, agriculture becomes vulnerable in 
times of drought. Although corn is generally a drought-tolerant crop, it is highly sensitive 
to water stress during its flowering stage, which has been identified as about 2 weeks 
before through 2 weeks following pollination (Nafziger, 2003). A thirsty condition at that 
time will prevent healthy silk emergence and pollination, and cause serious yield loss 
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(Heatherly and Ray, 2003). A study shows that moisture stress during the pollination 
period may cause 3-8% of corn yield loss for each day of stress (Lauer, 2006). Statistics 
(NASS, 2006) also show that Illinois has historically suffered substantial corn yield loss 
from droughts. For instance, while it is difficult to separate the effects of drought and 
heat, the corn yields in 1988, 1995, and 2005, when both extensive droughts and higher 
temperatures occurred across the state, are 45, 28, and 21% lower than the yields in the 
respective previous years.  
In recent years, corn price has both been rising sharply and increasingly tied to the 
world price of oil, in light of growing demand for corn-based ethanol fuel. Additionally, 
an international food shortage (caused in part by the increasing use of ethanol fuel), and 
the concerns about more erratic drought patterns caused by global warming have 
contributed to the price rise. As of the summer of 2008, corn price has at times topped 
$8/bu ($315/t), according to the Chicago Board of Trade (www.cbot.com), although at 
current writing, it is back down in the $4 ($182/t) range. As a result, irrigation may be 
considered increasingly economically practical for Illinois farmers to safeguard their crop 
yield and income. Eheart and Libby (1981) showed that irrigation would be profitable 
when corn price reaches about $6 per bushel or higher.  
The competition between agricultural and non-agricultural users would emerge if 
irrigational withdrawals from surface water increase. The safe yields of the two major 
municipal water reservoirs, Lake Decatur and Lake Springfield, are currently sufficient 
for their respective cities. When filled at normal pool level, the reservoirs can meet the 
cities’ needs for more than 12 months without inflow. However, irrigation, if becoming 
common in the watershed, would reduce the inflow to, and consequently the safe yields 
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of, the lakes. Moreover, downstream irrigators may exercise the Riparian Doctrine and 
claim their rights to part of the reservoir water, which would further decrease the 
availability of the reservoir water for the cities. Such competition would likely be further 
intensified by a prolonged drought, such as the ones that happened in 1988 and 1989. 
 
4.2 Setup for Allocation Analysis 
4.2.1 The Allocation Network 
 In a water allocation analysis, river channels, storage, and water intake facilities 
are often conceptualized into a simplified network system. In this study, a river is 
simplified as a dendritic network system consisting of zones and control points. Control 
points are river cross-sections where streamflows are measured or regulated, such as 
gages and reservoir outlets. Zones are river segments or water storages confined by 
immediate upstream and downstream control points. Each zone receives water from its 
upstream neighboring zone(s) through its upstream control point(s) and local drainage, 
distributes the water between local users, and then passes the remaining water to 
downstream zones. It is assumed that the river system is at steady state and that channel 
lag times are nonexistent. This assumption is sufficiently accurate when allocation is 
administered on monthly or seasonal basis. 
In this study, the Sangamon River is considered to consist of 17 zones and the 
same number of control points (figure 4.2). Qualified control points are defined as stream 
gages and reservoir inlets and outlets. Two reservoirs, Lake Decatur and Lake Springfield, 
are included as storage zones supplying municipal and industrial (M&I) users. Clinton 
Lake is not considered because the power plant returns nearly 99% of the cooling water 
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back to the lake, and hence, has limited impact on mid- to long-term availability of the 
streamflow. Hence the remaining 15 zones are all considered to be free running streams 
supplying agricultural users. It is assumed that the water allocation network holds two 
essential properties, unidirectionality and dendricity. Unidirectionality refers to the fact 
that water can only flow from upstream to downstream (in this case, right to left), but not 
the reverse. Dendricity implies that a zone can have multiple upstream inlets, but only 
one downstream outlet. For examples, zones 11 and 15 have 4 and 3 inlets, respectively, 
but both have only one outlet. 
While corn and soybean cultivations are highly mixed in this region and the ratio 
of the two crops varies widely from year to year, it is assumed, for convenience, that all 
the riparian agricultural land is planted with corn, so that the allocation result from each 
year can be obtained on the same demand basis. Since corn normally requires 
considerably more irrigation than soybeans (Heatherly and Ray, 2003), the all-corn 
assumption represents a scenario that requires maximal agricultural water demand under 
the existing farming conditions in central Illinois. It is further assumed that all the users 
in an agricultural zone can be regarded as one aggregated user with a coordinated 
irrigation schedule. The two cities are also each treated as a single M&I user, since they 
withdraw water through only one intake from their respective lakes. Hence, in this 
conceptualized allocation system the Sangamon River system serves a total of 17 users, 2 
of them being M&I users and 15 of them agricultural. In reality, of course, uses of 
different types and schedules are more geographically mixed. For example, in light of the 
recent Locavore Movement (see e.g. Weber and Matthews, 2008), there is a trend toward 
local production of fruits and vegetables, which require considerably more irrigation than 
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traditional grains. This issue can be addressed by declaring a control point somewhere 
between two users of different types, even if there is no significant tributary near that 
point.    
Furthermore, the following conditions are assumed: 
1) All withdrawals are consumptive, i.e. no return flow is considered. 
2) In each zone, the withdrawal happens just above the downstream control point, 
so that the user has the full access of the water available to that zone. 
3) The free running stream channels have zero water retention capacity. 
4) No inter-basin water transfer exists (although trans-boundary water input and 
output can be easily incorporated with minor modification of the system). 
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Figure 4.2 Sangamon River water allocation network 
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4.2.2 Sources of Water 
 Three sources of water are considered in the present allocation study: rainfall, 
streamflow, and release from reservoir storage. 
 Rainfall is an important water input and favorable irrigation substitute for 
agricultural users. In wet years, abundant rainfall alone can fully meet the needs of plant 
crops and leave irrigation activities unnecessary. Rainfall information is also critical in 
determining the relationship between water input and crop yield, which is required to 
derive the water use benefit function for the allocation analysis. In this study, historical 
rainfall is obtained from the National Climate Data Centre database. A total of 22 
weather stations with available daily precipitation are identified within the Sangamon 
River watershed. Missing data are generated using the records at the nearest station. 
Average rainfall is calculated for each of the agricultural riparian zones. 
 When rainfall is insufficient to supply crop needs, riparian farmers will turn on 
their irrigation systems, which are assumed to take water directly out of nearby streams. 
Hence, the availability of natural streamflow is also critical information for the allocation 
analysis. In this study, historical flow records are collected from 12 USGS stream gauges. 
Streamflow data at ungauged control points or gauges with incomplete records are 
estimated using the hydrological model Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) 
(Arnold et al., 1998; Neitsch et al, 2002). The SWAT model is calibrated following the 
same procedure reported by Hu et al. (2007).  
 The hydrologic impacts of the reservoirs should also be properly accounted for in 
order to reconstruct the natural flow conditions. The existing data at gages downstream of 
the reservoir reflect the streamflow that has been affected by the M&I withdrawal. Hence, 
when downstream flow measurements are available, the natural streamflows are 
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estimated by those measurements plus an amount that is equal to the M&I withdrawal 
rate. When downstream flow measurements are not available, the natural streamflows are 
estimated by the simulated streamflows, which are generated by SWAT based on a 
reservoir-free condition, less an estimated reservoir loss (mainly evaporation). Note that 
although SWAT itself has the ability to simulate reservoir storage, the model is not 
configured to perform this task in this study. Rather, it is used only to produce the pre-
reservoir streamflows. The impact of the reservoirs is handled separately in a spreadsheet 
using the method described above, which appears to be technically more convenient.  
The amount of stream water that is available for withdrawal is affected by the 
minimum in-stream flow standard. In-stream flow is mandatorily required to maintain 
sound ecological functions of the streams. In this study, the 7-day 10-year low flow 
(7Q10) is chosen to be the minimum in-stream flow standard, but any other constant or 
seasonally-specified value could be used. The 7Q10 values at different sections on the 
Sangamon River have been well documented by the Illinois State Water Survey (ISWS, 
2002). It is necessary to point out that 7Q10 is a fairly optimistic choice for a low flow 
standard, since many states require a considerably higher environmental flow, such as the 
10th percentile of the flow. It has by no means been determined that such a standard will 
adequately protect the aquatic ecosystem; the standard is used here because it is so 
readily available. It should be clear, however, that any other standard could be used. 
 Knowledge about the initial reservoir storage in each simulation period is also 
needed for the water allocation simulation in this study. Ideally, the available reservoir 
storage of the two lakes in each allocation period should be determined through a 
continuous reservoir routing analysis, which requires a detailed water balance accounting. 
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Such study requires accurate information about the hydrological inputs and outputs. In 
this case, however, some of the water budgets, such as runoff from ungaged tributaries 
that go directly into the reservoir, evaporation, and exchange between impounded and 
underground water, etc., are poorly understood. In a long-term allocation simulation, 
error introduced by inaccurate data may accumulate rapidly as the water balance progress 
over time, causing the analysis to fail in short order. Calibration using existing lake 
storage data is an effective way to control the error, but unfortunately, historical lake 
storage records are not available for this study.  
 Instead of conducting an extensive water balance to determine reservoir storages, 
the present study chooses a series of storage availability (reservoir capacity) conditions 
from 0% to 100% of the actual reservoir capacity (which is regarded here as a maximum 
capacity) as the input for the water allocation simulation. For each simulation run, only 
one level of reservoir capacity (as a fraction of the maximum) is selected for both 
reservoirs throughout the entire simulation span, regardless of the actual weather and 
hydrologic conditions. As a result, the simulation generates two extremes of possible 
allocation outcomes under different reservoir conditions. The actual allocation and the 
performance of the system will probably lie somewhere between these two extremes.  
4.2.3 User Specification  
 All agricultural withdrawals are assumed to be used on riparian land. It is 
assumed that the farmland irrigated by stream water extends an average distance of 0.2 to 
0.8 km from the waterfront on both sides of the stream, depending on the size of channels 
(Table 4.1). The down stream channels with relatively higher flow can support larger 
irrigation areas than the smaller channels upstream. The length of the channels is 
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estimated based on the USGS digital map of Streams and Waterbodies of the United 
States (National Atlas of the US, 2006). This will result in a total area irrigated by surface 
water of about 1.25 × 105 ha. The total volume of water needed by each agricultural user 
during the selected allocation period is equal to the rainfall deficit times the land area 
owned by the user. 
 Moreover, it is assumed that all the agricultural users have already installed an 
irrigation system. As a result, the water allocation is not affected by capital investment 
considerations. 
 
Table 4.1 Agricultural riparian zone width. 
User No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Riparian 
zone width 
(km) 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 
User No. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15  
Riparian 
zone width 
(km) 
0.2 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8  
 
 
  The current water demands by the M&I users, namely the cities of Decatur and 
Springfield, are about 1.71 m3/s (39 mgd) (Keefer and Bauer, 2005) and 1.19 m3/s (22 
mgd) (Fitzpatrick and Harbison, 1986; Skelly, 2007), respectively.  
Each agricultural or M&I user is assumed to hold an entitlement to water right, 
which is considered to be freely transferable from one riparian user to another. The size 
of the entitlement is determined by averaging the multi-year optimal demand for both 
agricultural and M&I users. The users’ entitlements not only specify the withdrawal limit 
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for the users, but also provide the numerical basis for the proportionally fair allocation. 
Moreover, it is assumed that all users are rational individuals who have perfect 
knowledge of their optimal demand and are able to maximize their economic benefit 
given a specific set of physical and regulatory constrains. No user would consume more 
than his or her optimal demand. 
 
4.3 Allocation Horizon 
 In this study, allocation is implemented only during the critical period of each 
growing season, which is usually several weeks before and after corn tassel emergence. 
In this case, each year’s allocation horizon is considered to be the period of 30 days 
before through 20 days after corn tassel emergence based on the work of Calvino et al. 
(2001) (see section 4.4 for detail). For the rest of the year, agricultural water demands are 
assumed to be negligible compared to this period. 
 The current analysis also assumes that a withdrawal and transfer plan is made 
only once at the beginning of the allocation horizon each year. Users follow the plan 
strictly throughout the period. It is assumed that the water allocation decisions are made 
with perfect foresight of the amount of rainfall, streamflow, and available reservoir 
storage during the entire allocation period. The perfect-foresight allocation will set a 
benchmark of what can best be obtained under each different allocation mechanism. 
 Allocation analysis is performed once a year from 1977 through 2006. This 30-
year period covers a wide range of climatic conditions, containing extremely dry years, 
such as during 1988 and 1989, several moderately dry years, such as the ones in 1991, 
1997, and 2005, a very wet year, 1993, and many normal to wet years. It is largely 
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representive of the spectrum of moisture conditions Central Illinois has received 
historically. 
4.4 Development of Water Use Benefit Functions 
4.4.1 Agriculture 
 The present water allocation analysis requires a suitable irrigation benefit function, 
which links the amount of water applied and the consequent profit gain received by the 
agricultural users. The function should contain an embedded water-yield model which 
quantifies the impact of water input on corn yield. The water-yield model should be able 
to capture the maximal beneficial water input, beyond which no or negative improvement 
in corn yield can be resulted from additional water input. The maximal beneficial water 
input serves as a basis to determine each user’s initial water rights entitlement. Moreover, 
the water-yield model for this study needs to capture the increasing trend in corn yield 
over years due to advance in agricultural technologies. Finally, the water use benefit 
function should have a concave property, so that the water allocation models can generate 
a unique optimal solution. 
Based on the criteria described above, the present study reviewed several existing 
water-yield models for corn (Runge and Odell, 1958; Runge, 1968; Yaron, 1967; Leeper 
et al., 1974; Calvino et al., 2001; Diaz and Brown, 1997; Burke et al., 2004; Cai et al., 
2007), but found that none of them meets all the requirements. Instead of adopting one of 
them, his study borrows some features from these models and developed the following 
log-quadratic relationship: 
 lnY = a0 + a1yr + a2yr2 + a3(R + w) + a4(R + w)2 + a5GDD  (4.1) 
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where lnY is the natural logarithm of corn yield (kg/ha), yr is calendar year, R is total 
natural rainfall during the period of 30 days before through 20 days after corn tassel 
emergence (mm), w is the amount of irrigation applied during the same period (mm), 
GDD is the total growing degree day in this period (oC), and a0 through a5 are 
coefficients to be determined by regression.  
The growing degree day during each year’s simulation horizon is calculated as 
   ∑+
−= ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+=
20
30
min,max, 10
2
s
s
d
di
ii TTGDD     (4.2) 
where Tmax,i and Tmin,i are the maximum and minimum temperature of Julian day i, and ds 
is the Julian date of corn tassel emergence. Each year’s corn tasseling date is determined 
by the cumulative growing degree days since the beginning of the corn growing season, 
i.e. the corn seeding date. This study assumes the corn seeding date to be May 1st, based 
on Hu et al. (2007) and the growing degree days needed to bring corn to tassel emergence 
to be 708.3 oC-days, based on Nafziger (2003) for all simulation years. 
This water-yield model combines features from several existing models. It adopts 
the quadratic form of the Yaron function (Yaron, 1967), incorporated the temperature 
effect considered by Runge (1968) and Leeper et al. (1974), chooses the irrigation period 
suggested by Calvino et al (2001), and borrows from the Runge and Odell (1958) the idea 
of using year as a predictor to capture the increasing trend in annual yield. In addition, a 
log transformation is applied to the corn yield term in order to improve the goodness-of-
fit between model prediction and historical data. Furthermore, in addition to the single 
linear year term in the Runge-Odell model, the present model includes a quadratic year 
term, which is shown to be statistically significant based on historical data.  
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Regression analysis based on the basin total corn yield from 1930 through 2006 
(NASS, 2006) shows that all the coefficients in the yield model (4.1) are statistically 
significant with p-value <0.002, suggesting that all the terms in the model are statistically 
important predictors of the corn yield. The resulting R2 is 0.944 (Table 4.2 and Figure 
4.3). 
 
Table 4.2 Coefficients in the crop yield function for the entire Sangamon River basin 
 
Coefficients Value Standard error t-value p-value 
a0 -662.5 60.0 -4.80 8 × 10-6
a1 6.61 × 10-1 6.09 × 10-2 4.71 1 × 10-5
a2 -1.63 × 10-4 1.55 × 10-5 -4.57 2 × 10-5
a3 5.35 × 10-3 4.28 × 10-4 5.44 7 × 10-7
a4 -1.23 × 10-5 1.16 × 10-6 -4.62 2 × 10-5
a5 -1.15 × 10-3 1.55 × 10-4 -3.23 2 × 10-3
 
 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Co
rn
 Y
ie
ld
 (k
g/
ha
)
Observed
Modeled
 
Figure 4.3 Observed and modeled corn yield 
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It is worth noting that alternative crop yield models and combinations of 
predicting terms have also been evaluated. For example, the Leeper model, incorporated 
with the first- and second-order year terms, produces an R2 of 0.940. For another example, 
using 6 weeks before through 4 weeks after corn tassel emergence, which is suggested by 
Runge (1968) and Leeper et al. (1974) as the critical irrigation period, Equation (4.1) 
achieves an R2 of 0.932. It is found finally that, of all the alternatives Equation (4.1) with 
30 days before through 20 days after corn tassel emergence as the critical period achieve 
the highest R2 value. 
To capture the zone-to-zone variation in crop production, a yield-water use 
function is developed for each of the agricultural zones.  The coefficients are listed in 
Appendix. 4.A. 
Given the crop yield function, the net benefit ($/ha) generated by irrigation in a 
given year is calculated as: 
  NBag = pcY(w) – pcY(0) – cvw – Cf     (4.3) 
where pc is the sales price for corn ($/kg), Y(w) is the corn yield calculated by equation 
(4.1) with irrigation of w unit of water (kg/ha), Y(0) is the corn yield with no irrigation 
(kg/ha), and cv is the variable irrigation cost consisting primarily of energy, maintenance, 
and other operation-related costs that are directly proportional to the use of the equipment 
($/ha-mm), and Cf is the annualized fixed irrigation cost associated with the capital 
investment and ownership of the equipment ($). 
Depending on the purpose and setup of the problem, the fixed irrigation cost can 
be treated in two different ways, which would in turn affect how the allocation analysis is 
performed and how the results are interpreted. If all the agricultural users in the allocation 
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system have already installed irrigation equipment, and water allocation and/or water 
rights transfers are to be determined independently on a year-to-year basis, then the fixed 
costs should be treated as sunk costs, which appear as zero in the users’ net benefit 
functions. This is referred to as Case I. As shown in Figure 4.4, since the fixed costs are 
treated as sunk cost with no value, the net benefit curve starts as a zero value, since the 
fixed costs are sunk. In that case, the values of fixed costs do not affect the users’ 
marginal benefits, and therefore have no impact on the solutions to the MaxBen and 
water rights market models as described in Chapter 3. As stated in section 3.7, the water 
rights market that exists under such conditions is a ‘spot market’, where water rights are 
transferred to meet short-term needs.  
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Figure 4.4 Functions of irrigation cost, benefit, and net benefit 
 
On the other hand (Case II), if few or no users, have installed irrigation equipment 
and capital investment decisions are involved in the allocation process, then the analysis 
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will be conducted in a different way. In that case, the net benefit function for non-
irrigating agricultural users should be modified from Equation (4.3) to: 
  NBag = pcY(dw) – pcY(0) – cvdw – dCf   (4.4) 
where d is a newly-introduced binary decision variable that indicates whether an 
investment in irrigation equipment will be made, 1 for yes, and 0 for no. If a user chooses 
not to install irrigation equipment, then her withdrawal, as well as the resulting net 
benefit, will either be zero, if the right is retained, or positive if it is sold to another user 
for revenue. If the user chooses to install irrigation equipment, then the Case II curve in 
Figure 4.4 is applicable. This curve shows a net benefit equal to the negative capital cost 
if equipment is bought but not used. To justify the capital investment, the user needs to 
acquire enough water to ensure that her investment is profitable, i.e. the total net benefit 
within a reasonable investment life (normally 15 to 20 years) is positive and may (or may 
not) thus choose to purchase some rights from another user. Therefore, a water allocation 
analysis of the sort that is the subject of this thesis would be performed on a 15 to 20 year 
basis, and the results would be seen as a long-term allocation and/or water rights transfer 
plan, which is tied to the joint capital investment decisions of all users.  
For convenience, this study chooses Case I, i.e. capital costs are assumed sunk 
and capital decisions do not affect users’ decisions on withdrawals. Case II, where water 
allocation and capital investment decisions are considered together, is left for future 
studies. Because it has no impact on water allocation solutions, the capital cost term is 
simply eliminated from the irrigation net benefit functions. As a result, the agricultural 
net benefits calculated based on the allocation solutions will only reflect irrigation-related 
net economic gain without capital costs.  
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Up-to-date irrigation cost information based on Illinois farmland is very limited. 
The present study utilized the data obtained from a detailed irrigation cost study recently 
conducted in Kansas (Dumler and Thompson, 2006; Dumler and Rogers, 2006). Based 
on the study, the energy cost for a diesel-powered, low head lift central pivot irrigation 
system, which is likely to be suitable for the riparian farmlands in Illinois, is, in 2008, 
about $0.5/ha-mm when diesel fuel price is $0.79/L ($3/US gal). Labor and Maintenance 
cost adds about another 0.1 $/ha-mm, assuming an average irrigation of about 100mm per 
year. Therefore, the total variable cost is estimated to be 0.6 $/ha-mm. This cost is treated 
as a baseline cost representing the existing condition in the study watershed. 
 
4.4.2 Municipal and Industrial (M&I) Use 
 
 The M&I users are assumed to follow the benefit function developed by Diaz and 
Brown (1997). The marginal water use benefit is expressed as the following exponential 
function of M&I water withdrawal: 
   b(w) = αe-w/β       (4.5) 
where b is the marginal water use benefit for M&I users ($/m3), w is the flow rate of M&I 
withdrawal in the allocation period (m3/s), and α and β are coefficients with the units of 
$/m3 and m3/s, respectively. In economic terms, Equation (4.5) is also called the inverse 
demand function, which indicates the water use cost needed to balance out the benefit at a 
given consumption level. As Figure 4.5 shows, this function generates a reducing 
marginal benefit as the amount of water use increases. The benefit B is then the integral 
of the marginal benefit function from 0 to w: 
   B(w) = α · β [1 – exp(– w/β)]     (4.6) 
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Thus, the net benefit for M&I use is 
   NBM&I = B(w) – cww      (4.7) 
where cw is the marginal cost associated with M&I water use in $/m3. The unit of B and 
NBM&I in (4.5) and (4.6) is $/s. They need to be multiplied by the total number of seconds 
in the entire allocation period to arrive at the total M&I benefit and total net M&I benefit 
in $. As Figure 4.6 shows, this function has a unique maximum, at which the marginal 
benefit equals the marginal cost of water. 
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Figure 4.5 Marginal benefit of M&I water use. 
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Figure 4.6 Benefit, cost, and net benefit of M&I water use. 
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 Now the question is how to determine the values of α and β. The present study 
follows Diaz and Brown (1997) in estimating these two parameters. First, the value of β 
is calculated using the price elasticity, which is defined by the proportional change in the 
amount of water used as a result of per unit change in water use cost. When demand and 
supply are at equilibrium, which is assumed for the M&I users in this study, the marginal 
cost is equal to the marginal benefit calculated by (4.4). Thus, the price elasticity in this 
case is formulated as: 
   
)(
/)(
/
/
wb
wwb
bb
ww
′=∂
∂=ε       (4.8) 
Substituting (4.5) and its first derivative into (4.8), we have: 
    βε
w−=       (4.9) 
 Water supply price elasticity has been widely studied in the United States. Diaz 
and Brown (1997) summarized 39 recent studies and found that ε varies from -0.02 to -
1.24, with most between -0.3 and -0.7. Unfortunately, similar research has not been 
conducted in the Central Illinois region. After reviewing available literature, this study 
chooses ε = -0.5 for the M&I benefit functions for both Springfield and Decatur. A 
sensitivity analysis is conducted later to examine the impact of ε value on allocation 
outcomes. 
Given the selected price elasticity, the value of β can be easily determined by 
rearranging (4.9). As stated above, the present study assumes that the current withdrawal 
and price reflect the equilibrium of demand and supply, i.e. a condition where the 
marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit: 
    αe-w/β = cw      (4.10) 
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Hence, the value of α can be determined by rearranging (4.10) given a known marginal 
water use cost. 
 In this study, water use cost for M&I users is considered to include both water and 
sewer/wastewater costs. Water rate information is obtained from a study by 
Dziegielewski et al. (2004), which surveyed more than 400 community water systems in 
Illinois, including Lake Decatur and Lake Springfield. The study finds that the marginal 
water prices at 18.9 m3/month (5000 gal/month) usage level, which represents 
approximately the average water rate of the systems, are $0.45 and $0.41/m3 for the 
Decatur and Springfield, respectively. The sewer rate is available only for Springfield 
from the City Water, Light & Power (2008), which shows the sewer rate for Springfield 
residences is $0.37 /m3 as of 2008. Household sewer cost is normally calculated based on 
water meter reading without adjustment. Information about industrial and commercial 
water/wastewater costs in the region is unavailable for this study, but presumably the 
costs are greater than those of residential use. Considering the above information and 
effects, the current water use cost for both M&I users in this study is chosen to be 
$1.0/m3. 
 
4.5 Allocation Scenarios 
 Two allocation scenarios are evaluated in this study: the ‘Current’ Scenario, 
which is based on the status quo of water demand and cost, and the Future Scenario, 
which imposes the projected water demand and cost. Quotation marks are used because 
the ‘Current’ scenario is based on the hypothetical condition that all the riparian 
farmlands have installed irrigation systems, which is not currently true in Central Illinois. 
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Nevertheless, the rest of the scenario largely represents the pre-existing conditions in the 
watershed. 
The major input parameters for both scenarios are listed in Table 4.3. The 
‘Current’ scenario calculates crop yield on the basis of the calendar year 2006 being used 
for yr in the yield model for the entire 30-year simulation period. As described earlier, 
current corn price and irrigation cost are set at $0.16 /kg ($4 /bu) and $0.6 /ha-mm, 
respectively. Agricultural water demand by each user each year is determined as the 
water input that maximizes the net benefit function (4.3). Current M&I demands are fixed 
to 1.71 and 1.19 m3/s for cities of Decatur and Springfield, respectively, for the entire 30-
year period. The analysis of the ‘Current’ scenario will tell us what allocation outcomes 
would result from different water sharing and market mechanisms under the semi-
hypothetical current demands and over a 30-year range of hydrologic conditions. 
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Table 4.3 Important parameters for the ‘Current’ and Future scenarios 
 
 ‘Current’ Future 
Baseline year for crop production 2006 2030 
Inflation adjustment 1 2.28 
Irrigated area ×1 ×2 
Irrigation cost* $0.6 /ha-mm $1.68 /ha-mm 
Corn price* $0.16 /kg ($4 /bu) $0.37 /kg ($9.4 /bu) 
M&I water withdrawal   
        Lake Decatur 1.71 m3/s (39 mgd) 1.93 m3/s 
        Lake Springfield 1.19 m3/s (28 mgd) 1.59 m3/s 
Water price* $1.0 /m3 $2.3 /m3
M&I water benefit function parameters:   
        α (Decatur, Springfield) 7.4, 7.4 16.9, 16.9 
        β (Decatur, Springfield) 0.68, 1.3 0.60, 0.90 
* In current dollar values. 
 
 
 
The Future Scenario is based on the vision that both the amount and the cost of 
water consumption in the study watershed will increase in the future as a result of the 
increase in crop production, irrigation area, municipal development, and raw material 
prices. The year of the future scenario is chosen to be 2030, by which time both irrigation 
and municipal demands are expected to increase. The area of irrigated riparian land in the 
Future Scenario is assumed to be twice as much as in the Current Scenario. The doubled 
irrigation areas are comparable to the amount assumed used by An (2004). The M&I 
water demands in the Future Scenario are expected to increase by 1.34 and 1.13 times the 
current amount for the cities of Springfield and Decatur, respectively. This is based on 
the prediction of county-level water supply needs in the Midwest conducted by 
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Dziegielewski et al. (2004).  Corn yield in this year is projected using the yield function 
(4.1), which predicts a growing trend yield. While continuous increase in corn yield in 
future is still a matter of debate, this prediction appears to be consistent with the results of 
several existing studies (Tannura et al., 2008; Troyer, 2006; Kucharik and Ramankutty, 
2005; Garcia et al., 1987). Both benefits and costs of water use in the Future Scenario are 
projected based on their historical trend between 1980 and 2007. Corn price was 
increasing by about 3.0% per year on average in this period (see Figure 4.7, Agricultural 
Marketing Resource Center, 2008) and is predicted in this study to increase at a rate 1.2 
times faster than this rate in the future, reflecting the augmenting demand for corn due to 
the boom of the corn ethanol industry and generally increasing petroleum price. This 
seemingly optimistic prediction is partially based on the assumption that corn ethanol will 
continue to be one of the main types of biofuel in the future and the global demand for 
energy will continue to rise. The uncertainty associated with this prediction will be 
addressed by sensitivity analysis and qualitative discussion. Irrigation cost is assumed to 
inflate at the same rate as the gasoline price, which has been about 3.7% on annual 
average (Figure 4.7). The cost of M&I water consumption is assumed to increase at the 
same rate as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the US (US Census Bureau, 2008), which 
has been about 3.5% on annual average (Figure 4.7). As a result, the corn price, irrigation 
cost, and M&I water cost in 2030 would be 2.3, 2.4, and 2.3 times higher than their 
respective value in 2006. 
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Figure 4.7 US Consumer Price Index and prices of gasoline and corn from 1980 
to 2007 
(1 corn bushel = 25.4 kg, 1 US gallon = 4.785 L) 
 
 
Finally, in order to better compare the results between the ‘Current’ and the 
Future Scenarios, all monetary results are converted to the 2006 dollar using the average 
growth rate in CPI between 1976 and 2006.  
 
4.6. Execution of Allocation Analysis 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the framework of the computer program developed for the water 
allocation analysis. The allocation scenarios and net benefit functions are used to 
determine the formula of the objective functions of the allocation models. Raw data of 
flow, weather, and river geometry were used to develop the constraints of the models. 
Missing flow data are generated by the SWAT model, which also require raw flow and 
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weather data for calibration. The program is developed using Visual Basic for 
Application (VBA) under the Microsoft Excel environment. The allocation model is 
solved using the Generalized Reduced Gradient Algorithm (Abadie and Carpentier, 1969) 
provided by Excel.  
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Figure 4.8 Diagram of water allocation simulation processes 
Objective 
Function 
Constraints 
M&I 
Benefit
Agricultural 
Benefit
Allocation 
Mechanisms
Water 
Balance
ALLOCATION 
SIMULATION 
OUTPUT 
Market 
Reallocation Allocation 
Amount 
bought/sold 
Withdrawal 
Amount 
Prices Economic 
Benefit  
Benefit gain 
via market 
Equity Index 
Flow data Weather data Allocation 
Scenarios 
SWAT 
generated data 
Optimal 
withdrawal 
Benefit Function 
Parameters 
River Network 
Geometry 
 
 
88
APPENDIX. 4.A. Coefficients of Crop Yield Functions for Agricultural Users 
 
 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
User 1 -212.8 0.2116 -5.156E-05 2.252E-03 -5.206E-06 -4.130E-04 
User 2 -243.7 0.2428 -5.945E-05 2.286E-03 -5.372E-06 -4.092E-04 
User 3 -280.4 0.2799 -6.882E-05 2.338E-03 -5.574E-06 -4.174E-04 
User 4 -296.0 0.2953 -7.265E-05 2.781E-03 -6.444E-06 -4.992E-04 
User 5 -289.9 0.2897 -7.137E-05 2.226E-03 -5.255E-06 -4.426E-04 
User 6 -320.5 0.3199 -7.872E-05 2.452E-03 -5.600E-06 -8.918E-04 
User 7 -320.5 0.3199 -7.872E-05 2.452E-03 -5.600E-06 -8.918E-04 
User 8 -320.5 0.3199 -7.872E-05 2.452E-03 -5.600E-06 -8.918E-04 
User 9 -257.5 0.2558 -6.247E-05 2.152E-03 -4.924E-06 -7.480E-04 
User 10 -257.5 0.2558 -6.247E-05 2.152E-03 -4.924E-06 -7.480E-04 
User 11 -282.7 0.2821 -6.938E-05 2.750E-03 -6.297E-06 -3.684E-04 
User 12 -317.9 0.3182 -7.859E-05 2.252E-03 -5.336E-06 -5.186E-04 
User 13 -298.5 0.2980 -7.333E-05 2.560E-03 -6.000E-06 -5.832E-04 
User 16 -277.9 0.2767 -6.778E-05 2.339E-03 -5.382E-06 -7.616E-04 
User 17 -289.3 0.2881 -7.069E-05 2.399E-03 -5.451E-06 -5.429E-04 
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 Water allocation simulation for the Sangamon River system with 17 agricultural 
and M&I users is performed under two scenarios. The ‘Current’ scenario is based on a 
mixture of real and hypothesized economic conditions in 2006, whereas the Future 
scenario imposes water demands that are estimated based on projected economic changes 
in 2030. For each scenario, the five allocation programs introduced in Chapter 3, namely 
the Maximum Benefit (MaxBen), Proportionally Fair (ProFair), Downstream Priority 
(DPrio), Upstream Priority with Municipal and Industrial User Privilege (UMIPrio), and 
No Rule (NR) programs, are evaluated using the historical rainfall and streamflow data 
from 1977 through 2006 combined with a series of different reservoir storage conditions. 
Recall that storage conditions are expressed here as a percent of the maximum, which 
consist of 34.5 mcm at Decatur and 63.4 mcm at Springfield. The percentage is applied 
uniformly to the two reservoirs. The monetary results of the Future Scenario are 
converted to the 2006 dollar using a discount rate estimated from the long-term average 
growth in the Consumer Price Index. 
 
5.1 Economic Benefits 
5.1.1 Aggregated Net Benefit and Total Withdrawal 
 Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the aggregated net benefits resulting from the selected 
water allocation programs under the Current and the Future demand scenarios, 
respectively, over the range of hydrologic conditions that occurred between 1977 and 
2006. In the figures, the wide bars indicate the net benefits achieved when both Lake 
 
 
90
 
 
91
Decatur and Lake Springfield are empty (i.e. zero-storage condition); and the narrow bars 
on top of the wide bars indicate the additional net benefit achieved when both reservoirs 
are full (i.e. 100% storage condition). The actual net benefits vary within the ranges of 
the narrow bars, depending on the actual reservoir storage conditions.  
An immediate observation from Figure 5.1 and 5.2 is that under both demand 
scenarios, the aggregated net benefits achieved by the selected allocation programs are 
not significantly different from each other in the majority of the simulation years. 
Particularly, no difference among the programs is found in 16 and 13 of the 30 simulation 
years under the ‘Current ‘and the Future demand scenarios, regardless of the reservoir 
stage. Such a result reflects the fact that the humid Midwestern weather can provide 
sufficient water supply to meet all demands in normal years, and suggests that the choice 
of allocation mechanism is not important in those years. Considerable difference among 
programs happens in years where both rainfall and streamflow are remarkably low. For 
example, under the ‘Current’ scenario, the difference is most prominent under the 1988 
condition, in which the basin-average rainfall and total streamflow in the allocation 
period are only 37 mm and 12.4 m3/s, respectively, which are substantially lower than the 
average 163 mm and 118 m3/s over all simulation years (see Figure 5.5). Under the 
Future Scenario, more notable difference among programs is found under less sever 
droughts, such as those of 1989 1991, and 2005, in which rainfall and runoff in the 
allocation time window are about 100 mm and 30s m3/s, respectively. 
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Figure 5.1  Aggregate net be 2006$: ‘Current’ Scenario 
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Figure 5.2  Aggregate net benefit in 2006$: Future Scenario 
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Figure 5.3  Aggregate net benefit in 2006$ sorted by rainfall: ‘Current’ Scenario 
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Figure 5.4  Aggregate net benefit in 2006$ sorted by rainfall: Future Scenario 
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Figure 5.5  Sangamon River basin rainfall and runoff during allocation windows 
 
 The relationship between water availability and aggregate net benefit is better 
shown by Figure 5.3 and 5.4, which is nothing different from Figure 5.1 and 5.2, except 
that the results from individual years are sorted in ascending order of rainfall. The sorted 
figures show that the aggregated net benefit is generally negatively correlated to the 
rainfall. This result reflects the fact that water uses (especially agricultural uses) yield 
more economic benefit in dry years than in wet years. However, a notable exception is 
found under the hydrologic conditions of 1988, which marks the 8th driest year in the 
recorded Illinois weather history (Winstanley et al., 2006). Although water is much 
needed in this year, the net benefit from withdrawal is not as great as in many other dry 
years, especially under the low reservoir storage conditions. This is simply because the 
streamflows are so diminished by the drought that there is little water left for the users to 
withdraw, regardless of their locations and entitlements. Hence, although the water has a 
high marginal value in this year, the total water use benefit is not great due to the limited 
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availability of water. A similar situation also occurs in 1991, but to a lesser extent. 
Aggregate net benefit is highest in years where rainfall is relatively low and streamflow is 
just enough to make up for the rainfall deficit, such as 1980 and 1997. 
 Figure 5.3 and 5.4 also show that the range of impact of the reservoirs on water 
allocation, which is indicated by the differences between the full-storage and zero-storage 
net benefits (i.e. the height of the narrow bars in the figures), increases as the natural 
water supply from rainfall and runoff decreases. Such impact appears to become more 
obvious when rainfall in the allocation period drops below about 120 mm/yr. According 
to the results, low availability of reservoir storage not only reduces the economic output 
of the entire system, but also widens the gaps among alternative allocation programs. 
This result reflects the different preference each program has between agricultural and 
M&I users. Since the marginal benefit of M&I withdrawal is often much greater than that 
of agricultural withdrawal, the resulting net benefit of the entire system is heavily 
influenced by how much water the M&I users can finally receive, which is determined by 
the allocation rules. As the reservoir storage condition improves, the gaps among 
programs attenuate rapidly (Figure 5.6). At full storage, the difference among alternative 
programs becomes zero or insignificant in all simulation years.  
The economic benefits of all water allocation programs escalate substantially as 
the demand scenario shifts from ‘Current’ to Future. The range of annual average 
aggregated net benefit across programs and reservoir storage conditions increases from 
34.8 ~ 38.9 to 46.1 ~ 54.7 M$ in 2006 value, an increase of 31~40%. The agricultural and 
M&I sectors both contribute to this net benefit increase gaining 75~86% and 11~21%, 
respectively.  
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The growth in net benefit in the Future scenario is mostly a result of growing 
water need. It is found that the agricultural, M&I, and total water withdrawals all increase 
under the Future Scenario (Table 5.1 to 5.3). In contrast to the net benefit results, on 
which the selection of program has a considerable influence, the total water withdrawals 
are found nearly identical among alternative programs (Table 5.3). This result suggests 
that all the selected programs, although differ in economic results, are able to achieve 
overall similar level of physical efficiency. Depending on the reservoir condition, the 
average annual total withdrawal under the Future Scenario is 65 ~ 72% greater than that 
under the ‘Current’ Scenario. Both agricultural and M&I withdrawals appear to be 
largely consistent across the selected programs as well, except for some small variations 
(all within ±0.4 m3/s) under low reservoir storage conditions. The withdrawals by the two 
sectors grow by 72~83% and 7~21%, respectively, under the Future Scenario depending 
on the reservoir storage condition.  
 
Table 5.1. Annual average agricultural withdrawals under the ‘Current’ and Future 
Scenarios. “Reservoir Capacity” is tabulated as the percentage of maximum capacity. 
‘Current’ agricultural withdrawal (m3/s) Future Agricultural withdrawal (m3/s) Reservoir 
Capacity MaxBen ProFair NR DPrio UMIPrio MaxBen ProFair NR DPrio UMIPrio
0% 11.8 12.1 12.1 11.8 11.8 20.8 21.4 21.4 21.0 20.8 
10% 12.3 12.4 12.3 12.3 12.2 21.4 21.9 21.5 21.7 21.4 
20% 12.4 12.5 12.4 12.5 12.4 21.9 22.2 21.9 22.1 21.9 
30% 12.5 12.6 12.5 12.6 12.5 22.3 22.5 22.4 22.6 22.4 
40% 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 22.6 22.8 22.7 22.8 22.7 
50% 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 22.8 22.9 22.9 23.0 22.9 
60% 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 22.8 23.0 22.9 23.1 22.9 
70% 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 22.9 23.0 23.0 23.1 23.0 
80% 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 23.0 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 
90% 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 
100% 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 
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Table 5.2. Annual average M&I withdrawals under the ‘Current’ and Future Scenarios. 
‘Current’ M&I withdrawal (m^3/s) Future M&I withdrawal (m^3/s) Reservoir 
Capacity MaxBen ProFair NR DPrio UMIPrio MaxBen ProFair NR DPrio UMIPrio
0% 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.8 3.2 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.3 
10% 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.4 3.1 3.4 3.2 3.5 
20% 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.5 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.5 
30% 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.5 
40% 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.5 
50% 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 
60% 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 
70% 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 
80% 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
90% 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
100% 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
 
Table 5.3. Annual average agricultural withdrawals under the ‘Current’ and Future 
Scenarios. 
Current total withdrawal (m3/s) Future M&I withdrawal (m3/s) Reservoir 
Capcaity MaxBen ProFair NR DPrio UMIPrio MaxBen ProFair NR DPrio UMIPrio
0% 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 
10% 15.2 15.1 15.1 15.1 15.1 24.8 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 
20% 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.3 25.4 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 
30% 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4 25.8 25.9 25.9 26.0 25.9 
40% 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 26.1 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 
50% 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 26.3 26.4 26.4 26.4 26.4 
60% 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 26.4 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 
70% 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 26.4 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 
80% 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 26.5 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.6 
90% 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 
100% 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 
 
5.1.2 Comparing Economic Benefit of Alternative Allocation Mechanisms 
 One of the main purposes of the allocation analysis is to compare the performance 
of the selected allocation mechanisms. The MaxBen program is based entirely on the 
optimization of economic values, assuming that all utility functions for individual users 
are precisely known. No additional constraints are considered other than water balance. 
Therefore, the BM program always achieves the highest aggregate net benefit regardless 
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of the supply/demand condition. It sets an economic bench mark for all allocation 
mechanisms. 
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Figure 5.6  Average annual aggregated net benefit vs. reservoir storage condition 
under (a) ‘Current’ and (b) Future scenarios. 
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 The economic performance of the rest of the programs is largely influenced by the 
reservoir storage conditions. When reservoir levels rise beyond about 30 to 40%, the 
ProFair program on average appears to achieve the closest economic benefit to MaxBen 
(Figure 5.6). When reservoir levels are at 10 to 30%, the NR and UMIPrio programs 
exceed DPrio and ProFair to achieve the second highest economic benefit. When the 
reservoirs are empty, the UMIPrio program, which first secures the high-value M&I 
consumption achieves the second highest economic benefit, whereas the NR program, 
which first benefits the upstream agricultural users in this case produces the lowest 
economic efficiency. The net benefit of the NR program increases more rapidly than any 
other program when the reservoir storage increases from zero to 10%. This is because the 
NR program, while allocating M&I users little or no water when the reservoirs are empty 
and streamflow is too low to even satisfy the upstream agricultural users, allows the M&I 
users exclusive access to the reservoir storage once available. Finally, the DPrio program, 
which prioritizes users in the reverse order of upstreamness, constantly produces the 
worst economic benefit under all, except for the 0%, reservoir conditions.  
 Closer examination of the breakdown of the agricultural and M&I sectors (Figure 
5.7 and 5.8) reveals that the ProFair program constantly generates the greatest 
agricultural benefit among all the selected programs except for MaxBen. It even exceeds 
MaxBen in agricultural benefit when available reservoir storage is less than 20%. This 
result shows that a ProFair program would be slightly more beneficial for low-value than 
high-value users. On the other hand, the UMIPrio program, as expected, produces the 
highest M&I benefit under all reservoir and demand conditions. 
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Figure 5.7  30-year average net agricultural benefit vs. reservoir storage condition 
under (a) ‘Current’ and (b) Future scenarios. 
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Figure 5.8  Average annual net M&I benefit vs. reservoir storage condition under 
(a) ‘Current’ and (b) Future scenarios. 
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These results show that no program other than MaxBen is able to dominate in 
economic efficiency under all hydrologic conditions. In a water shortage, a program that 
is able to secure high value M&I withdrawals first tends to achieve higher net benefit 
than a program that spreads water more evenly among users. A program that can neither 
guarantee high value withdrawals nor evenly share water among users, such as the DPrio 
program, is likely to result in the worst economic efficiency under all hydrologic 
conditions. 
 
5.2 Equity 
 As explained in Chapter 3.7, the Equity Index (EI), defined by Eq. 3.20, is 
developed to quantify the fairness among users achieved by an allocation program. It 
measures the degree of similarity among users with respect to their water supply 
satisfaction, where water supply satisfaction is defined as the ratio of a user’s actual 
withdrawal to its demand. The value of EI can range between zero and one, where a value 
of one indicates perfect fairness, in which all users receive the same level of water supply 
satisfaction, and an EI of zero indicates perfect unfairness, in which only one user is 
allowed to withdraw, nobody else. 
 
5.2.1 General EI Results 
 Figure 5.9 and 5.10 show the 30-year EI series resulted from the studied programs 
under selected reservoir conditions. It can be observed that EI values are generally 
negatively correlated with rainfall under all programs and reservoir conditions. Perfect EI 
values (i.e. EI = 1) occur most frequently in wet years with rainfall in the allocation 
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period greater than 200 mm, while the lowest EI values happens in dry years with rainfall 
less than 100 mm. EI differentiation among programs tends to escalate in dry years under 
low reservoir storage conditions, but attenuates as the reservoir levels improve. 
Under the ‘Current’ scenario, EI values resulting from the selected programs are 
not substantially different from each other and range between 0.6 and 1 for most years. In 
9 of the 30 simulation years, EI equals one regardless of program selection or reservoir 
storage conditions, suggesting that in those years rainfall and runoff together can provide 
enough water to fully satisfy every user’s need. In some other years, different programs 
produce nearly identical EI values that are substantially less than 1. This results because 
the moisture in those years is distributed such that it can fully satisfy all but a small 
number of headwater users, who, without any upstream input or access to outside sources, 
cannot improve their water supply condition no matter what program is selected.  
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Figure 5.9 Equity Index series under selected reservoir storages: ‘Current’ 
scenario. 
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Figure 5.10 Equity Index series under selected reservoir storages: Future scenario. 
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The largest EI differentiation happens in the extraordinary drought of 1988, in 
which EI values vary greatly under low (<30%) reservoir storage conditions, ranging 
from 0 under the DPrio program to 0.65 under the ProFair program. The zero EI value 
reflects the fact that 1988 is so dry that all the available water in that year has, by the 
downstream priority rules, to be allocated to the most downstream user and no one else. 
As the reservoir condition improves, the difference attenuates quickly and EI values 
converge to about 0.5, which is the lowest of all years. 
 As the scenario changes from ‘Current’ to Future, EI values decrease and year-to-
year variation increases in general for all programs and all reservoir conditions. The 
number of years in which EI equals one regardless of program selection or reservoir 
storage conditions decreases from 9 to 6 (Figure 5.10). Depending on the reservoir level, 
the 30-year average EI values from alternative programs (Figure 5.11) decrease by 5 to 
11%, while year-to-year variation (Figure 5.12), measured by the 30-year standard 
deviations, increases by 10 to 59%. The difference in both mean and standard deviation 
of EI among the selected programs increase in response to the increased demands. 
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(b) 
Figure 5.11. 30-year average EI value vs. reservoir storage condition under (a) 
‘Current’ and (b) Future scenarios 
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 (b) 
Figure 5.12. 30-year standard deviation of EI values under different reservoir 
storage conditions under (a) ‘Current’ and (b) Future scenarios 
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Under the Future Scenario, the severe drought in 1988 continues to be the cause 
of the largest deviation in EI among alternative programs and the deviation remains 
pronounced when the available reservoir storage increases to 50%. Some other years, 
such as 1989 and 2005, also show considerable difference in EI under low reservoir 
storage conditions. 
The above results suggest that as demand grows and supply shrinks, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for a water allocation program to retain fairness among users. 
5.2.2 Comparing Equity of Alternative Allocation Mechanisms 
 Figure 5.11 shows that under both the ‘Current’ and Future Scenarios, the ProFair 
program achieves consistently the highest average EI value at all reservoir levels, 
although such advantage becomes quite small when the reservoirs approach full storage. 
This result is consistent with Figure 5.9 and 5.10, where we see the ProFair program 
achieving the highest equity index in nearly all simulation years, regardless of reservoir 
levels and demand scenarios. ProFair’s advantage is most pronounced in dry years, such 
as 1988, 1989, 2005, etc, with low reservoir storage conditions. Besides, the ProFair 
program appears to be more capable of maintaining stable fairness under variable 
hydrologic conditions than any other programs. As shown in Figure 5.12, the program 
results in the lowest standard deviation over the 30-year simulation span, regardless of 
the reservoir storage condition.  
Under both demand scenarios, the NR program closely follows ProFair and 
consistently achieves the second highest average EI values at all reservoir levels (Figure 
5.11). Its EI values become almost indistinguishable from ProFair as the reservoirs 
approach full storage. At the same time, NR results in the second lowest year-to-year 
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variation. The 30-year standard deviation of its EI lies above ProFair and below the rest 
of the programs at low reservoir levels (<20%). 
The UMIPrio program, which is in effect nothing more than a NR, except for the 
M&I-first aspect, generates the same EI values as NR when reservoir storages are greater 
than 20%, but falls below UMIPrio at lower reservoir storage conditions (Figure 5.11). 
The lower EI’s at low reservoir levels are a result of less evenly apportioned withdrawal 
rights under the M&I-first rule. As the reservoir storages increase (>20%) and the M&I 
users become fully satisfied, UMIPrio and NR become equivalent to each other, and 
therefore start to produce identical EI values. 
The MaxBen program, although it generates the highest net economic benefit, 
does not result in the best EI values. Under the ‘Current’ demand conditions, MaxBen 
largely follows the trend of NR, while under the Future demand conditions, it 
consistently falls below NR at all reservoir storage levels (Figure 5.11). 
Under both demand scenarios, the DPrio program, which weights water rights in 
the order of downstreamness, consistently generates the lowest and least stable EI values 
at all reservoir capacity levels (Figure 5.11 and 5.12). Unlike the other programs, which 
all have some capability to protect upstream withdrawals, the DPrio program allows no 
withdrawal by an upstream user unless all his/her downstream peers have been fully 
satisfied. Hence, the DPrio program is likely to create more zero-withdrawal users than 
any other program, and hence result in the lowest EI values. As we have seen earlier, 
under an extremely dry year like 1988, DPrio program allocates all available water to 
only one user that is located at the downstream end of the watershed, resulting in an EI 
value of zero. 
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The above results suggest that among the studied programs, ProFair is capable of 
providing the most equitable allocation under all supply/demand conditions, where equity 
is measured by how evenly the water supply shortfall is distributed among all users. The 
MaxBen program, although it generates the greatest economic benefit, is not the fairest 
water allocation mechanism. The DPrio program appears to be the most unfair water 
allocation mechanism under all conditions. 
 
5.3 Water Market Analysis 
The water market analysis (see Sec. 3.7) in this study is built upon the assumption 
that the water can be transferred in a perfect market, where buyers and sellers have 
complete information about demand/supply conditions and are subject to no transaction 
cost or externality. Besides, no capital investment is considered in the trading process 
since this study assumes that all infrastructures needed for water consumption are already 
in place. The impact of excluding externality and capital investment on water market 
simulation will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
5.3.1 Impact of Water Availability on Water Market  
The market analysis discovered that water trading activities in a spot market 
setting are strongly affected by water availability. As a typical indicator of the level of 
market activities, the maximum aggregate market gain, calculated as the difference 
between the aggregate net benefit between the MaxBen and a given program, is found to 
be negatively correlated with the rainfall in individual allocation periods (Figure 5.13). 
Recall that Section 3.7 demonstrates the equivalence between the MaxBen allocation and 
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the market equilibrium of any given initial allocation. Water transfers are likely to be 
profitable when rainfall is less than about 150mm, and become mostly unbeneficial when 
rainfall increases beyond 200mm. This result is consistent with the common perception 
about water market that high rainfall creates high water supply and results in low demand, 
whereas low rainfall reduces supply and stimulates demand.  
The same trend is generally found in the relationship between market activity and 
reservoir storage, but with a small number of exceptions. As shown in Figure 5.13, the 
aggregate market gain generally declines as the storage of the reservoirs increases (the 
points representing higher reservoir storage conditions mostly fall below those 
representing lower storage conditions), reflecting a similar supply-demand interaction as 
described above. However, an opposite trend is sporadically observed, mostly under the 
Future Scenario of the UMIPrio program; that is, market gain sometimes increases with 
improving reservoir conditions. This opposite trend is particularly strong when rainfall is 
low (<120mm/yr). This result is simply because under that program the increased 
reservoir water is not allocated to the users with the highest marginal water use benefit. 
Hence, instead of easing the market demand, the additional water supply promotes more 
market activities. 
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         i) ProFair    ii) DPrio             iii) UMIPrio         iv) NR 
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Figure 5.13  Annual aggregate market gain as percentage of optimal allocation net benefit. 
(b) Future Scenario  
(a) “Current” Scenario 
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Also seen in Figure 5.13 is that regardless of the pre-market allocation program, 
the potential market gains under the Future Scenario generally exceed their 
corresponding values under the ‘Current’ Scenario. The range of rainfall conditions for 
profitable water transfer also becomes wider under the Future Scenario. This result 
suggests that the projected economic development and the consequential water demand 
increase will likely create more market opportunities for water rights transfer in the future. 
 
5.3.2 Market-Creating Capability of Individual Programs  
It is found that the DPrio is able to create some of the highest potential market 
gains in a single year among all the studied programs. However, those high market gains 
tend to occur only in extremely dry years, and market activities are quickly depressed as 
rainfall increases. On the other hand, the UMIPrio program provides the least market 
opportunity for water rights transfers and its resulting market gains are low under all 
rainfall conditions. The sharp difference between the two priority-based programs reflects 
the fact that given the current setup of this study, most water transactions in the 
Sangamon River watershed will be made between M&I and agricultural users. Under the 
DPrio program, the M&I users are forced to pass water to downstream agricultural users, 
leaving themselves short of water during a drought. Hence, M&I users have a strong 
incentive to pay the downstream farmers a reasonable price for keeping water in their 
own reservoirs. Under the UMIPrio program, on the other hand, the M&I users are 
already offered an advantage over agricultural users; so there is no agricultural user that 
they can buy water from. As a result, water market activity is low. 
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Compared with the agricultural-to-M&I water transfer, water transfers among 
agricultural users are limited under the current setup. Since the agricultural users are 
largely homogeneous in terms of water consuming activities and benefit functions, 
trading among agricultural users are often of relatively small scale. But again, this is 
based on the assumption that capital costs are not involved. Farmers may have interests in 
long-term water transfer agreements if capital costs are considered (see more discussion 
later in this Chapter). 
Under the ProFair and NR programs, water transfers appear to be potentially 
profitable under a wider range of rainfall conditions (Figure 5.13), compared to the DPrio 
and UMIPrio programs. With the NR program as the pre-market allocation, trading can 
potentially occur most often when reservoirs are empty. As reservoir storage increases, 
the NR program allows the cities to get the first access to the reservoir water, which 
would rapidly reduce the M&I users’ demand and their potential trading benefit. Thus, 
we see a quick drop of potential net benefit gain under the NR program. In contrast, 
market activities drops more slowly with increasing reservoir storage under the ProFair 
program, because the M&I users are required to share a portion of the added supply to 
their downstream peers. 
It should be noted that the NR program is different from the other programs in 
that it is largely an unregulated program, which does not require a definition for each 
user’s water rights entitlement. Strictly speaking, a water market cannot be effectively 
established under this program. However, the NR program can be seen as an ‘Upstream 
Priority’ program, which is mathematically equivalent to NR, but requires clear 
specification of water rights. In this sense, the market size calculated based on the NR 
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rules is not for the NR program per se, but for a mathematically equivalent Upstream 
Priority program in which the physical advantage of an upstream location were converted 
into an equivalent legal advantage that allowed marketing of a resource by the first 
person to have the right to capture it. It is analogous to a northern duck hunter selling her 
right to shoot a duck to a southern duck hunter during the fall migration. 
 
5.3.3 Water Market in the 1988 Drought  
Due to the multi-user nature of the Sangamon River system, the trading 
relationship among the users can be quite complicated. To better understand such a water 
market, this study uses the year of 1988 as a special case to investigate closely the 
potential trading relationship among individual users and the trading outcomes. The year 
of 1988 is selected because it represents an extremely dry scenario wherein market 
opportunities are the greatest.  
Several parameters are calculated to characterize the 1988 water market, 
including the amount of water that can be potentially transferred, the prices at which 
water is transferred, and the resulting total market revenue and profit. Table 5.4 shows 
the parameters that describe the potential trading activities of each of the users in the 
study watershed and the aggregate economic result of such activities under each of the 
selected water allocation programs in 1988. Figure 5.14 shows the trading relationship 
among the users, namely who are buying from or selling to whom. Both Table 5.4 and 
Figure 5.14 are generated based on the ‘Current’ Scenario and the zero reservoir storage 
condition. 
 Table 5.4 Water market under alternative allocation programs (Year = 1988, Scenario = ‘Current’, Reservoir storage = 0%) 
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                   User Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total 
 User Type                   Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag M&I M&I Ag Ag
A MaxBen Allocation 0 0 0 0.22 0 0 0        0 0 0.07 1.84 0 0 0.74 0.52 0 2.71 6.09 
B Net Benefit under MaxBen ($M) 0              0 0 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 4.09 0 0 12.61 8.78 0 5.09 31.2 
C 
Marginal benefit 
under MaxBen 
($M/m3/s) 
1.92                  1.95 2.04 2.21 1.72 1.61 1.62 1.71 1.61 1.72 2.21 1.78 1.90 9.10 9.10 1.77 1.59 ---
 Market under ProFair Program 
D Pre-Market allocation (m3/s) 0.35                 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 1.31 0.25 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.38 2.71 6.09 
E Pre-Market Net 
Benefit ($M) 0.66                 0.20 0.24 0.39 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.12 2.92 0.43 0.27 3.16 2.15 0.64 5.09 16.7 
F Potential Water Transfer (m3/s)a -0.35 -0.10 -0.12 0.05   -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0 0.53 -0.25 -0.14 0.62 0.43 -0.38 0 1.62
f
G Sales/Purchase Price ($M/m3/s) 2.21                 2.21 2.21 2.21 9.10 9.10 9.10 9.10 9.10 - 2.21 9.10 9.10 9.10 9.10 9.10 - --- 
H Sales Revenue/ Purchase Cost ($M)b 0.78                 0.23 0.26 -0.10 0.55 0.51 0.68 0.49 0.33 0 -1.16 2.25 1.30 -5.61 -3.91 3.42 0 10.8
g
I Benefit gain/loss($M)c -0.66 -0.20 -0.24 0.10   -0.11 -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 -0.06 0 1.17 -0.43 -0.27 9.45 6.63 -0.64 0 14.5 
J Net Gain through Water Transfer ($M)d 0.12                 0.03 0.02 <0.01 0.44 0.42 0.56 0.40 0.27 0 0.01 1.82 1.04 3.84 2.72 2.78 0 14.5 
K Post-Market Net Benefit ($M)e 0.78                 0.23 0.26 0.39 0.55 0.51 0.68 0.49 0.33 0.12 2.93 2.25 1.30 7.00 4.86 3.42 5.09 31.2 
L Post-Market Allocation (m3/s) 0              0 0 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 1.84 0 0 0.74 0.52 0 2.71 6.09 
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Table 5.4 Water market under alternative allocation programs (Year = 1988, Scenario = ‘Current’, Reservoir storage = 0%) (Cont’d) 
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                  User Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total
                    User Type Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag M&I M&I Ag Ag
 Market under DPrio Program 
D Pre-Market allocation (m3/s) 0            0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.09 6.09 
E Pre-Market Net Benefit ($M) 0                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.27 8.4 
F Potential Water Transfer (m3/s)a 0              0 0 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 1.84 0 0 0.74 0.52 0 -3.38 3.38
f
G Sales/Purchase Price ($M/m3/s) -              - - 2.21 - - - - - 1.72 2.21 - - 9.10 9.10 - M
g --- 
H Sales Revenue/ Purchase Cost ($M)b 0              0 0 -0.48 0 0 0 0 0 -0.12 -4.05 0 0 -6.74 -4.69 0 16.1 16.1
g
I Benefit gain/loss($M)c 0              0 0 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 4.09 0 0 12.6 8.78 0 -3.17 22.9 
J Net Gain through Water Transfer ($M)d 0              0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 <0.01 0.04 0 0 5.87 4.09 0 12.91 22.9 
K Post-Market Net Benefit ($M)e 0              0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 <0.01 0.04 0 0 5.87 4.09 0 21.17 31.2 
L Post-Market Allocation (m3/s) 0              0 0 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 1.84 0 0 0.74 0.52 0 2.71 6.09 
 Market under UMIPrio Program 
D Pre-Market allocation (m3/s) 0.57 0.10 0.12 0.32          0 0    0 0 0 0.07 0.95 0 0 0.61 0.64 0 2.71 6.09 
E Pre-Market Net Benefit ($M) 1.04 0.20 0.24 0.72              0 0 0 0 0 0.12 2.11 0 0 11.3 9.76 0 5.09 30.6 
F Potential Water Transfer (m3/s)a -0.57 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10             0 0 0 0 0 0 0.89 0 0 0.13 -0.13 0 0 1.02
f
G Sales/Purchase Price ($M/m3/s) 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21              - - - - - - 2.21 - - 9.1 9.1 - - --- 
H Sales Revenue/ Purchase Cost ($M)b 1.25 0.23 0.26 0.23             0 0 0 0 0 0 -1.96 0 0 -1.15 1.15 0 0 3.1
g
I Benefit gain/loss($M)c -1.04 -0.20 -0.24 -0.22             0 0 0 0 0 0 1.98 0 0 1.28 -0.98 0 0 0.6 
J Net Gain through Water Transfer ($M)d 0.21 0.03 0.02              0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.13 0.17 0 0 0.6 
K Post-Market Net Benefit ($M)e 1.25 0.23 0.26 0.72             0 0 0 0 0 0.12 2.13 0 0 11.46 9.93 0 5.09 31.2 
L Post-Market Allocation (m3/s) 0              0 0 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 1.84 0 0 0.74 0.52 0 2.71 6.09 
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Table 5.4 Water market under alternative allocation programs (Year = 1988, Scenario = ‘Current’, Reservoir storage = 0%) (Cont’d) 
 
 
 User Index                  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total
                    User Type Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag Ag M&I M&I Ag Ag
 Market under NR Program 
D Pre-Market allocation (m3/s) 0.57                 0.10 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.27 0.21 0.07 0.95 0.34 0 0.20 0 0 2.71 6.09 
E Pre-Market Net Benefit ($M) 1.04                 0.20 0.24 0.72 0.18 0.09 0.12 0.38 0.27 0.12 2.11 0.60 0 4.75 0 0 5.09 15.9 
F Potential Water Transfer (m3/s)a -0.57                -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.06 -0.07 -0.27 -0.21 0 0.89 -0.34 0 0.52 0.54 0 0 1.85
f
G Sales/Purchase Price ($M/m3/s) 2.21                  2.21 2.21 2.21 9.10 9.10 9.10 9.10 9.10 - 2.21 9.10 - 9.10 9.10 - - ---
H Sales Revenue/ Purchase Cost ($M)b 1.25                0.23 0.26 0.23 0.99 0.51 0.68 2.45 1.91 0 -1.96 3.11 0 -4.95 -4.69 0 0 11.6
g
I Benefit gain/loss($M)c -1.04                -0.20 -0.24 -0.22 -0.18 -0.09 -0.12 -0.38 -0.27 0 1.98 -0.60 0 7.86 8.78 0 0 15.3 
J Net Gain through Water Transfer ($M)d 0.21                 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.80 0.42 0.56 2.06 1.65 0 0.01 2.52 0 2.91 4.09 0 0 15.3 
K Post-Market Net Benefit ($M)e 1.25                 0.23 0.26 0.72 0.99 0.51 0.68 2.45 1.91 0.12 2.13 3.11 0 7.66 4.09 0 5.09 31.2 
L Post-Market Allocation (m3/s) 0              0 0 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 1.84 0 0 0.74 0.52 0 2.71 6.09 
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a. F = A – D. Positive values indicate purchases and negative values sales. 
b. H = -G * F. Positive values indicate the revenue of the sellers and negative values the cost to the buyers. 
c. I = B – E. 
d. J = H + I. 
e. K = E + J 
f. The net total quantity of water rights that can be potentially transferred. 
g. The net total worth of potential transactions. 
h. Water bought by or sold to multiple users with different prices. 
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Figure 5.14  Water rights transfers among riparian water users along Sangamon River System  
(Year = 1988, Scenario = ‘Current’, Reservoir Storage = 0%)
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As discussed in Chapter 3, allowing water to be freely traded on a perfect market 
would ultimately result in an equilibrium that is identical to the benefit maximizing 
allocation. Given any pre-market allocation, water rights would theoretically move, 
without violating the water balance constraints, from relatively low marginal benefit 
users to those with relatively high marginal benefits through market mechanisms, until all 
users’ marginal benefits are as nearly equal as possible, within constraints, i.e. a market 
incentive no longer exists. The results in Table 5.4, which are derived from the solution 
to the optimization problem (3.14), demonstrate this process. Under the MaxBen 
allocation (rows A to C), the users who receive the most water are also those who have 
the highest marginal benefits. The marginal benefits under the MaxBen allocation also 
indicate the price each user is willing to pay for additional water. Under all the other 
programs, free-market trading always results in a post-market allocation (rows L) that is 
identical to the MaxBen allocation. The post-market aggregate net benefit is always equal 
to the one in the MaxBen allocation. For an individual user, the post-market net benefit 
(rows K) represents the potential economic worth of his/her initial allowable withdrawal. 
The potential trading relationship among users and the amount of water traded are 
determined by water availability, pre-market allocation, user benefit functions, and the 
geometry of the river network. As Figure 5.14 shows, the trading relationship under the 
1988 conditions can differ considerably under different allocation programs. The largest 
and smallest volumes of potential water transfers occur under the DPrio and UMIPrio 
programs, respectively (Table 5.4), which is consistent with the findings in Figure 5.13. 
Table 5.5 presents the total economic gain as percentages of the total post-market 
net benefits for the 1988 data under both “Current” and Future scenarios. The table shows 
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that the DPrio program would benefit the most from this perfect market arrangement; as 
much as nearly 67% of its total post-market net benefit could be obtained through water 
transfer. The UMIPrio program benefit the least from the perfect market, with market 
gain accounting for <10% of total percentage post-market net benefit. ProFair and NR 
program can both benefit substantially from the market when reservoir levels are low. 
As stated earlier, the reservoir storage level has significant impacts on water 
transfer activities. Under both ‘Current’ and Future Scenarios, the total amount of 
potential transfer increases first and then decrease after a peak as the reservoir storage 
condition improves from 0 to 100%. Such trend is found in all the non-MaxBen programs 
(Figure 5.15).  
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Figure 5.15  Total amount of potential water transfer under the (a) ‘Current’ 
and (b) Future Scenario in the 1988 drought 
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Table 5.5. Total economic gain through water transfer as percentage of total post-market 
net benefit in 1988. 
‘Current’ Scenario Future Scenario Reservoir 
Storage 
Level ProFair DPrio UMIPrio NR ProFair DPrio UMIPrio NR 
0% 46.3% 73.5% 1.9% 49.0% 52.6% 65.9% 1.1% 50.4%
10% 19.3% 71.3% 2.2% 2.8% 34.1% 67.5% 2.1% 9.3%
20% 6.5% 67.9% 1.8% 1.8% 20.1% 66.4% 2.5% 2.5%
30% 3.0% 13.1% 4.1% 4.1% 13.0% 67.7% 3.4% 3.4%
40% 0.9% 5.6% 1.3% 1.3% 8.5% 63.2% 5.5% 5.5%
50% 0.4% 0.1% 0.7% 0.7% 5.6% 60.3% 8.8% 8.8%
60% 0.4% 0.1% 0.7% 0.7% 3.9% 59.3% 7.0% 7.0%
70% 0.4% 0.1% 0.7% 0.7% 2.9% 43.9% 4.1% 4.1%
80% 0.4% 0.1% 0.7% 0.7% 1.6% 11.4% 2.0% 2.0%
90% 0.4% 0.1% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 4.9% 0.7% 0.7%
100% 0.4% 0.1% 0.7% 0.7% 0.3% 0.0% 0.5% 0.5%
 
 
The potential market gain is also affected considerably by reservoir storage 
condition (Figure 5.16). The DPrio program creates the highest market gain, which peaks 
at 30 and 60% reservoir storage conditions under the ‘Current’ and the Future Scenarios, 
respectively, and decreases rapidly thereafter. The ProFair program attains the highest 
potential market gain when reservoir level is zero under both demand scenarios. Its 
potential market gain decreases steadily with the increase of reservoir levels. The 
potential market gain under the UMIPrio program is relatively small compared with the 
other programs and forms a mild peak at a mid-storage condition. The NR program 
results in a potential market gain that is relatively high at the zero-storage condition, but 
rapidly reduces to the same as that of UMIPrio when reservoir levels reach beyond 20%. 
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Figure 5.16  Total potential market gain under the (a) ‘Current’ 
and (b) Future Scenario in the 1988 drought 
 
 
Comparing the 1988 market outcomes between the ‘Current’ and Future 
Scenarios, this study found that both the total volume and the total potential profit of the 
water market increases substantially given the projected future demand growth (Figures 
5.15 and 5.16). For all the non-MaxBen programs, the maximal increases in potential 
water transfer take place at about 50~60% reservoir storage (Table 5.6), ranging from 
about 11.5 to 22 × 106 m3. The maximal profit increases occur at different reservoir 
storages under different programs, ranging from about 5 M$ to 36 M$ (Table 5.6).  
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Table 5.6 Increase in amount of water transfer and profitability under projected future 
demand scenario. 
Increase in total water transfer (106 m3) Increase in total economic gain ($M) Reservoir 
Storage 
Level ProFair DPrio UMIPrio NR ProFair DPrio UMIPrio NR 
0% 0.13 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 3.2 -0.8 -0.2 1.6
10% 1.15 -0.34 0.34 -0.03 7.7 2.3 0.1 3.1
20% 1.85 1.07 1.07 0.50 7.0 3.6 0.4 0.4
30% 1.84 1.06 1.06 3.65 5.5 29.5 -0.1 -0.1
40% 2.26 3.20 3.20 4.63 4.3 32.6 2.4 2.4
50% 2.79 5.09 5.09 5.89 3.1 35.4 4.9 4.9
60% 2.68 4.40 4.40 5.96 2.2 36.3 4.0 4.0
70% 2.57 3.24 3.24 5.51 1.6 27.7 2.3 2.3
80% 2.01 2.08 2.08 3.42 0.9 7.3 1.0 1.0
90% 1.01 0.91 0.91 1.25 0.2 3.1 0.2 0.2
100% 0.32 0.22 0.22 0.09 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Studied Programs 
 The five mechanisms examined in this study can be seen as representing four 
fundamentally different water allocation principles: economic optimization (by MaxBen), 
equal sharing (by ProFair), non-regulation or deregulation (by NR), and prioritization (by 
UMIPrio and DPrio). 
 The MaxBen program is based on the economic optimization approach, which has 
been widely adopted in numerous water allocation studies. While the most economically 
efficient program in theory, the program can hardly be implemented directly by water 
authorities due to technical difficulties and potentially high administrative cost. The 
program requires comprehensive information about every user’s demand curve, which is 
often controlled by complicated and uncertain factors that are hard to apprehend. For 
example, how exactly would the economic value of a wetland property used for duck 
hunting change when its water level increases or decreases by a few inches? Or how to 
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measure the economic loss of a community that reduces its lawn irrigation by 10%? Or, 
on a larger scale, how much would the state of Alabama benefit if its share of water from 
the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River system is increased by one thousand cubic 
meters per day? Not to mention that users may alter their behavior under different water 
supply conditions, and hence make their demand curve even harder to determine. Even if 
such information is available, it would be extremely costly to obtain. Just imagine all the 
data collection, economic analysis, documentation, enforcement, and many other 
administrative efforts associated with every single user. 
 Despite being unrealistic, the MaxBen program is still quite useful from several 
perspectives. First, it sets a theoretical benchmark of the best economic outcome a water 
allocation program can possibly achieve. This benchmark will help water resources 
managers assess how far practicable programs fall short of the upper limit of economic 
benefit. Moreover, although a precise level of benefit maximizing management is 
impractical, the basic principle of the MaxBen program can be incorporated into water 
allocation regulations. For example, recognizing the difference in water demand elasticity 
between the agricultural and M&I consumptions, the regulators may design a program 
which allows M&I users to receive less withdrawal curtailment than agricultural users. 
The type-based priority program is another example, which embraces the idea of 
marginal benefit at a “ballpark” level. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the result of 
MaxBen program can be used to represent the outcome of a perfect water rights market. 
A wisely instituted water market can encourage users to estimate their own demand 
functions and maximize their profit through water purchases or sales, which, as shown in 
Chapter 3, would ultimately lead to an equivalent result as the MaxBen program. 
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Compared to the equal-marginal-cost criterion of the benefit maximizing 
allocation, the equal-proportional-satisfaction criterion of the proportionally fair 
allocation appears to be easier to implement. The water authorities do not need to know 
every user’s benefit function, which may be highly complicated and never precisely 
understood. Instead, they make allocation decisions based on easily observed water 
supply satisfaction coefficients, which are simply the ratios of the actual withdrawals to 
the originally permitted withdrawals or the users. The mathematics developed in Chapter 
3 provides an operational guideline for the ProFair program. The Proportional Fairness 
Criterion tells us what the final allocation should be under a given water availability 
condition; whereas the convex programming model and the Bottleneck Algorithm tell us 
how exactly the ProFair allocation is computed. However, the ProFair program still 
requires highly coordinated operations of water utilities throughout the whole system. As 
a result, the ProFair program may be subject to moderate administrative cost. The 
program would also need to determine the initial entitlement for each user, but the 
administrative cost in that regard should not be much different from those under other 
permit programs. 
Moreover, from a legislative point of view, one can argue that the ProFair 
program is even more consistent with the basic principles of the eastern water laws than 
the MaxBen program. Under MaxBen, a downstream farmer could lose all of his/her 
water rights to an upstream city in times of drought, simply because agricultural 
consumption is far less “valuable” than municipal consumption. In that case, the 
downstream farmer’s Riparian water rights are not effectively protected. Under the 
ProFair program, however, a user, regardless of his/her size or economic productivity, 
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can never be completely deprived of water rights, as long as he/she is a legal permit 
holder and there is still available water that can flow by the user’s property. In this regard, 
the ProFair program is in better accordance with the fair sharing spirit of the Riparian 
Doctrine. One can further argue that the most reasonable allocation of a limited water 
resource would be letting all uses’ satisfaction (or shortfall) ratios as equal to each other 
as possible, i.e. maximizing the allocation’s Equity Index, while making sure the resource 
is fully utilized. As shown in the results, the ProFair program always achieves the most 
equitable water allocation among all studied programs, especially in times of shortage; 
whereas the MaxBen program only scores the third or fourth of the five alternatives in 
terms of fairness. 
A major weakness of the ProFair is that it improves equity at the cost of losing 
economic efficiency. Historically, there have been court decisions that rejected the 
proportional approach to resolving water disputes, citing its inadequate consideration of 
economic impacts. As shown in the above results, the net benefit generated by ProFair 
can be substantially lower than MaxBen in times of drought, owning to the fact that 
ProFair may give the agricultural users too much credit. This drawback may be improved 
by adopting a better designed approach to determining the initial water permits, so that 
the economic concerns are carefully addressed from the very beginning. Alternatively, 
one can design a new allocation mechanism that allows the satisfaction coefficients of 
low value users to reduce faster (e.g. at a quadratic speed) than high value users. In that 
case, however, the proportional fairness criteria and the formula of the allocation model 
would have to be revised. 
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The advantage and disadvantage of the priority-based programs in the eastern-US 
setup has been extensively discussed in the literature review chapter. Despite the 
advocate of numerous scholars, the widely observed unpopularity and a number of 
reported failure of the time-based priority approach in the eastern US suggests that the 
Riparian states are yet ready to accept the western-style appropriative water rights. This 
study further illustrates that the economic and equity results of the priority based 
programs are heavily impacted by the geographical distribution of the priority ranks. 
Although the UMIPrio program can achieve the next highest economic benefit to 
MaxBen under many conditions, it requires all the upstream agricultural users to forgo 
their withdrawal rights to the downstream cities during extreme drought periods, which 
results in low fairness in the system. Unless the appropriative water rights have been 
firmly established by the administration and widely accepted by the general public, the 
program cannot effectively prevent the happening of water disputes, which can be subject 
to high legal cost. As for the other priority-based program examined in this study, the 
DPrio program produces the worst economic benefit and equity, and hence would not be 
a good choice for water agencies in the eastern states. 
An interesting finding is that the NR program is able to generate higher economic 
benefit than ProFair under moderately low to high reservoir storage conditions, while 
maintaining reasonable fairness, ranking the second in equity index under most dry 
conditions. The NR program to some degree represents the traditional Riparian Doctrine 
approach and the status-quo of water regulation in many regions in the eastern US, 
including central Illinois. It is in effect similar to an upstream-priority approach. The 
most obvious advantage of this program is that it can save considerable administrative 
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cost. Those results of this study suggest that for areas where water shortage problem is 
still not too serious, minimum regulation still seems to be a reasonable option for water 
agencies.  
However, the results also shows that the NR program produces the lowest 
economic benefit under the worst water supply conditions, suggesting that the absence of 
regulation could cause the worst economic consequences during the most severe droughts. 
In the long-term, with the continuously growing water demand, deepening water shortage, 
and escalating water competition, minimum regulation may no longer be an option of the 
water agencies in the eastern states. They will ultimately transform their water 
regulations based on one or a combination of the three other philosophies, namely 
economic optimization, equitable sharing, and prioritization. 
It should be noted that the simulation model for the NR program in this study 
overestimates the economic outcome by assuming that the M&I users, after their own 
demand is satisfied, would release the unused water from their reservoirs to downstream 
users, even if the release causes deficit in the reservoirs. In reality, M&I users will likely 
store the unused water until their reservoir is full, which will reduce water availability, as 
well as economic benefit, for the downstream users.  
 
5.4.2 Limitations of Current Water Rights Market Simulation 
The trading analysis in this study illustrates the potential of a water market in 
achieving a secondary allocation of improved economic efficiency. As mentioned earlier, 
however, from the modeling perspective the trading analysis is not able to capture two 
important aspects of water markets. One of the aspects is the impact of capital cost. The 
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water market simulation in this study assumes that all users have installed adequate water 
use facilities. Trading decisions are made based on the market conditions of the current 
year. In other words, what this study simulates is a ‘spot market’, wherein water transfers 
are driven by short-term demands. Thus, the simulation is not able to reflect the impact of 
capital investment on the trading decisions. In the reality of the eastern US, however, a 
question that needs to be answered in the first place by any withdrawer, especially a 
farmer, is whether it is profitable to invest in water facilities. If capital costs are large, it 
takes a certain minimum quantity just to reap enough benefit to pay for it before a net 
benefit ensues. So, it is easy to envision an arrangement whereby one farmer pays another 
for enough water rights to justify irrigation capital cost; while the other farmer is satisfied 
with the revenue obtained through the water rights sale and saves the trouble of 
infrastructure development. The success of this arrangement would require the transfer 
agreements to have adequately long horizons so that the investors have enough time to 
recover their initial capital costs. To properly simulate a market with the impact of initial 
capital cost, a model like the one developed by Wong and Eheart (1983) is needed. The 
model should have a component that quantifies the capital cost and should have binary 
decision variables in the objective function to represent farmers’ capital investment 
decisions. The results of this model would represent the long-term or permanent water 
transfer market, which has quite different values and meanings from the spot market 
simulated in this study. In reality, a water market may likely be a combination of both 
long- and short-term water transfers.  
Another item that is not captured in the simulation is the transaction cost. 
Although the initial model described in Chapter 3 (Eq. 3.14a and b) includes a transaction 
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cost term in the formula, the term is dropped in the simulation because of the perfect-
market assumption. A major reason for this study to exclude transaction cost is the lack 
of a reliable approach to quantify it. Experiences of water rights sales have been rare and 
poorly documented in the eastern US. There is little existing data about transaction cost, 
much less quantitative method. Thus, the economic gain of the market simulated in this 
study would be the maximum that a water market could achieve in theory. 
Obviously, a regulated market requires the recognition of externalities. The effort 
to address these externalities would be ultimately translated into extra costs to be 
shouldered by the participating parties of the water rights transfer. Experience in the 
western US suggests that transaction costs arising from the harmful third parties and/or 
environmental impacts are one of the major economic barriers that discourage water 
transfer practices. It is expected that high transaction costs would preclude all but the 
most economically beneficial transfers, and hence create an unfavorable market 
environment for the programs with low market-creating capability. Numerous studies (e.g. 
McCann and Easter, 2004; Carey et al., 2002) focusing on transaction cost issues have 
been performed and several methods have been developed to evaluate transaction cost 
under the context of the western US. It would be interesting to see if some of those 
methods can be adapted to the situations of the eastern US. At the same time, it is 
recognized that the Internet holds the potential to lower transactions costs, but the 
spontaneous development of trading websites in all likelihood will have to be preceded 
by the establishment of a functioning market. 
 
5.4.3 Other issues 
 134
 A water budget issue that is not explicitly considered in the current programs, but 
can be significant in many cases, is groundwater. The interactions between surface water 
and groundwater are often complex, depending heavily on the relative locations of the 
sources and the geological conditions in the vicinity. Generally speaking, with a shallow 
aquifer formed of porous materials, hydraulically connected to the stream, the well 
withdrawal would likely have an immediate decreasing impact on the streamflow, 
whereas with a deep aquifer confined by impervious materials with a well a great 
distance from the stream, the well withdrawal may have little detectable impact on 
streamflow. Some other situations would be somewhere in between the above two 
extremes. Site specific surveys would be needed to quantify the impact of groundwater 
withdrawal, as well as the associated return flow, on streamflow and the system-wide 
water budgets. 
 Another issue the current allocation programs have yet to address is how the 
users’ risk-averse behaviors impact the system efficiency when water supply uncertainty 
exists. Different from the retrospective analysis in this study, which utilizes real historical 
data, the practical decision making on water demand and water allocation often involves 
a high level of hydrologic forecasting and risk assessment. Many types of decisions on 
water use activities (e.g. agricultural) must be made with limited foresight of water 
availability during the activity life. Because of the fear of loss, water users may choose 
activities that are less prone to drought damage, and yet less profitable as well, even if the 
chance of a drought is low. They may also make extra investment in a variety of water 
conservation measures. The result of these risk-averse behaviors, both short-term and 
long-term, is a reduction of the overall economic benefit and loss of system-wide 
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efficiency. Moreover, risk-aversion, if not well-addressed at the policy level, may create a 
major obstacle to transfers in a water rights market. A deal is less likely to be made if the 
buyer is uncertain of the water supply reliability that the seller can provide. Therefore, the 
costs of risk aversion should be properly reflected in the economic models in order to 
evaluate an allocation program more comprehensively.  
It should be noted that the current allocation programs do not handle risk equally, 
and hence may result in different patterns of risk-averse behavior among users. The 
priority programs offer the best, if not full, protection to the users with the highest 
priority, while putting the users with lower priority at higher risk. In comparison, the 
ProFair program tends to distribute the risk evenly over the entire system. Although the 
‘total amount’ of risk is the same under both types of programs, the economic impacts of 
user’s risk-averse behaviors may differ considerably. It would be interesting to examine 
these impacts in future research. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Today, the eastern states of the United States are facing the challenge of growing 
water shortages that have emerged from rapid population growth, economic expansion, 
and changing weather patterns. There have been rising calls for reforming the loosely 
fashioned water allocation regulations in the eastern states, which have been built on the 
common-law Riparian Doctrine. Significant efforts have been made to transform the 
eastern water rights system toward the so-called ‘Regulated Riparianism’, which offers 
more accuracy and certainty to the water allocation management.  However, important 
issues remain to be adequately addressed, such as the legal contradiction between fixed 
permit programs and the common-law doctrine, balance between economic efficiency 
and fairness, and so on. 
 The present dissertation examines five alternative water allocation mechanisms 
for their suitability for the eastern United States. These water allocation mechanisms are 
rooted in four different regulatory principles. The Benefit Maximizing (MaxBen) 
allocation is based on economic optimization, which has been widely examined in 
existing water allocation studies. The Proportional Fairness (ProFair) allocation is based 
on equitable sharing, which is believed to best represent the spirit of the Riparian 
Doctrine. The Downstream Priority (DPrio) and the Upstream Priority with Municipal 
and Industrial User Privilege (UMIPrio) mechanisms are based on prioritization, which 
has been widely established in the western United States under the Prior Appropriation 
Doctrine. Finally, the No-Rule (NR) allocation is based on the principle of minimum 
regulation, which somewhat reflects the current reality in many regions in the eastern US. 
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An important contribution of this study is the introduction of the ProFair program. 
The program borrows the Proportional Fairness Criterion from the bandwidth allocation 
in wired and wireless communication networks and is for the first time introduced to 
solve water allocation problems. Serious efforts are invested in the modeling of this 
program. In addition to the log programming model, which is adopted from existing 
communication network studies, this study discovers that a quadratic programming 
model and a simple greedy procedure named ‘Bottleneck Algorithm’ can also achieve the 
same Proportionally Fair Allocation. 
Besides, a mathematical model is developed for each of the other water allocation 
programs. A linear programming model is each developed for the DPrio, UMIPrio, and 
NR programs. A non-linear programming model is developed for the MaxBen program. 
 The allocation programs are evaluated based on two criteria, namely economic 
efficiency and equity. Given a known allocation, the economic efficiency is calculated as 
the aggregate net benefit of all users. To quantify the fairness of a given allocation, a 
measurement called Equity Index is developed, which measures the level of uniformity in 
the water supply satisfaction levels among all users. 
 Following the primary allocation programs, this dissertation further develops a 
trading model to simulate the water market under each of the alternative programs. Based 
on the model, the study builds an analytical framework that can examine in detail several 
characteristics of a water rights market, such as the volumes of water transferred, prices 
at which water is transferred, transaction revenues, and net market gains. 
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 Water allocation and water market simulations under the five allocation programs 
are performed for the Sangamon River system in Illinois. The simulations choose two 
economic scenarios: the ‘Current’ scenario is based on a mixture of real and hypothesized 
water demands and economic conditions in 2006; the Future scenario imposes projected 
water demands and economic conditions in 2030. Historical rainfall and streamflow data 
from 1977 through 2006 combined with a series of different reservoir storage conditions 
are used as hydrologic input for the analysis. The monetary results are all converted to the 
2006 dollar. 
 The following findings emerge through the water allocation and reallocation 
simulation in the Sangamon River Watershed. 
1) The net economic benefits resulting from each of the allocation programs are in 
general negatively correlated with water availability, because greater water 
availability usually implies more rainfall, which renders abstracted water less 
valuable. With the projected increase in water demand and changes in economic 
conditions in the future, not to mention the possibility of more intense or frequent 
dry periods as part of global climate change, the net economic benefit of water 
use would increase accordingly. Depending on the program and initial reservoir 
condition, the average water use benefit ranges from around 34 to 39 M$/yr and 
46 to 55 M$/yr under the ‘Current’ and the Future scenarios, respectively. The 
amount of water allocated varies little across demand/supply conditions. 
2) The difference in net benefit among the selected programs tends to increase when 
any of the following conditions occur: i) rainfall decreases, ii) reservoir storages 
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decrease, and 3) water demands increase (the scenario moves from ‘Current’ to 
Future). 
3)  The MaxBen program achieves theoretically the highest net economic benefit. 
The UMIPrio program on average generates the second best economic value 
when the reservoir capacities are less than around 30-40% of maximum, but falls 
behind the ProFair program as the reservoirs continue to rise. The NR program 
produces the worst economic benefit when the reservoirs stay empty, but quickly 
improves as reservoirs capacities recover, and becomes identical to the UMIPrio 
program when they reach 20% of maximum. The poorest economic performance 
is given by the DPrio program, which produces the lowest net benefit under all 
but the zero reservoir storage condition. The results suggest that the economic 
performance of a priority-based program depends heavily on how it assigns the 
priority ranks to the users. 
4) The difference in Equity Index among programs appears to be insignificant in 
most of the simulation years, but is most pronounced in some of the driest years, 
such as 1988. Similar to the results of economic benefit, the program-to-program 
difference in the Equity Index tends to escalate with decreasing supply and 
increasing demand. 
5) Comparing the fairness performance among the selected programs, it is found that 
the ProFair program generates the highest and most stable Equity Index under all 
water supply and demand conditions, whereas the MaxBen program on average 
only scores the fourth, behind NR and UMIPrio. Interestingly, the NR program is 
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able to achieve relatively high level of fairness because of the highly uniform 
geographical distribution of rainfall and runoff over the Midwestern watershed. 
The DPrio produces the lowest Equity Index under all conditions. 
6) The market simulation shows that as rainfall decreases, the water market tends to 
become increasingly active, with both the volume of water transferred and the net 
market gain growing under all but the MaxBen programs. The water market 
appears to be most active when the rainfall in the allocation window is less than 
150mm. 
7) Given the projected demand increase in the future, the scale of the water market 
will also increase. With a 1988-type drought, the amount of water transfer and the 
associated economic gain under the Future demand conditions may, depending on 
the initial allocation program, increase by as much as 11.5 to 22 × 106 m3 and 5 
M$ to 36 M$, respectively, compared to those under the Current. 
8) The DPrio program appears to be able to create some of the highest potential 
market gains in a single year among all the studied programs, whereas the 
UMIPrio program provides the least market opportunity. Under the ProFair and 
NR programs, water transfers appear to be potentially profitable under a wider 
range of rainfall conditions, compared to those under the priority-based programs. 
9) The analytical framework presented in this study is able to simulate the trading 
relationship and price structure of a complicated multi-user water market.  
Based on the above findings, the present study recommends that policy makers 
should give more consideration to the ProFair program. The program stresses fair sharing 
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of available water, which is consistent with the reasonable-use legal theory of the 
Riparian Doctrine and hence reduces the chance of water disputes and the costs involved 
in the resulting legal procedures. As a favorable result, the policy makers in the eastern 
states may face fewer legal barriers in adopting this program than alternative options. The 
program may create lower economic efficiency than some of the other programs, but this 
shortcoming can be remedied by a water market arrangement that allows water rights to 
be transferred from low-value to high value users, either temporarily or permanently. The 
ProFair program is subject to other potential problems, such as difficulty in assuring the 
level of certainty desired by withdrawers. However, the purpose of this study is not to 
find a one-size-fits-all solution for the traditionally Riparian states. Rather, it explores 
one option that has some valuable advantages and is potentially more suitable in areas 
where belief in both a permit program the traditional Riparian Doctrine is strong. 
The water allocation programs described in this study are the simplest translation 
of the four basic water management principles of economic optimization, proportional 
fairness, prioritization, and minimum regulation. Simplifying assumptions are made for 
ease of mathematical simulation. These programs, in their current forms, are certainly not 
able to account for many complex situations in water management reality. Future studies 
should extend the programs by incorporating more sophisticated regulatory components, 
such as more complicated reservoir operation rules, seasonal or tiered minimum in-
stream flow requirements, return flows, water quality considerations, to name a few. 
More data should be collected and more complicated mathematical formulas should be 
integrated into the current models. 
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 Moreover, the present study only considers the water allocation in a specified 
critical period each year. Future research should, with the help of more sophisticated 
reservoir models and more detailed hydrological data, conduct the water allocation 
simulation on a more continuous basis. It would also be very helpful if future research 
could develop a method to quantify the administrative and/or transactions costs 
associated with each water allocation program. In that way, the programs can be 
evaluated on a more comprehensive economic basis.
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